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‘The Struggle of the Ants’ 
 
To be forgotten in the corner of the world 
Not my fault 
Has been buried by no means wasted 
I live in the cave 
Busy back and forth every day 
Do not care about other people how to say 
Ant small but broad minded 
Insists on being self 
 
Afraid of the wind I am not afraid of the wind 
Raindrops wet my dream 
Go ahead I go forward, 
The footprints me not ignorant 
 
Against the wind I am against the wind 
Way forward, although heavy 
I will be propped up with tentacles 
Rain patch of the sky 
 
Performed by: ‘the Ant Brothers’ 
Written by: Li Liguo and Bai Wanlong 
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Abstract 
The thesis presents an ethnographic study of a phenomenon that was unknown of and even 
unthinkable fifteen years ago in China, underemployed and unemployed rural graduates living 
on the fringes of both the city and society itself. Through the facet of one urban village on the 
outskirt of Beijing I uncover how the rural graduates’ situation, often called ‘the ant tribe, is a 
picture on what ambiguities lies within the Chinese society. Their position becomes 
problematic when they establishing themselves in informal settlements at the periphery of the 
city. Here the rural graduates live together with other migrants and in a sense bringing 
civilization to the uncivilized and illegible part of the city. Not only is their situation a crack 
in China’s narratives of education and modernity, but it’s also directing attention to the 
growing pressure on urban housing, need for change in household system and social inclusion 
for people that also want to take part in the economic development in China.  
It is through analysing the rural graduates situation that we come to comprehend how 
the Chinese state manifest itself in the structures where the rural graduates live, but also how 
it is conceived and reflected upon in people`s everyday practise in creating a meaningful life. 
“Improve myself” have become the phrase among the youths in achieving this goal. During 
the course of this thesis I want to argue for a new rationality of governing and subject 
formation in China, where the subjects have become self-governing. Which has also lead to a 
change among young rural graduates towards a more individualistic lifestyle and perception 
of life in contrast to earlier collective communities. This can be observed in renewed focus on 
the self, the consumer patterns, but also how the individual is establishing networks founded 
in themselves in a new relation to the collective. 
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Theoretical and methodological perspectives 
In the same year that the population of China1 officially shifted from living mostly in rural 
areas to urban areas, Xiwang Cun, a small urban village on the outskirts of Beijing was 
swamped with rural graduates seeking work in the big city. The ethnographic study presented 
in this thesis shows a phenomenon that was unknown of and even unthinkable fifteen years 
ago in China. State-owned units no longer dominated urban economies and college graduates 
were free to look for employment on their own instead of direct job assignment through the 
state. However, it was not until the beginning of the 2000’s that unemployment among rural 
graduates became an issue in China. Thus, little work has been done on this field and I believe 
this ethnographical account focusing on the underemployed2 rural graduates living on the 
fringes both of the city and society itself can be in important contribution in understanding the 
changing dynamics of the Chinese society today. 
Through studying the lived everyday life of the rural graduates in the urban village 
Xiwang Cun the aim of this thesis is to uncover cultural specific traits and articulations of 
governmentality to understand the changing dynamics of modern subject formation in China. 
I analyse this by looking at how the Chinese party-state communicate and related to the new 
situation of underemployed and unemployed rural graduates living on the outskirts of the big 
cities. Moreover, there is a need to understand how the rural graduates relate to their situation 
when their expectations of the city do not match reality. Accordingly, I discuss and analyse 
how rural graduates place themselves within the national discourse of suzhi- human quality, 
and wenming- civilization- in reaching modernity.  
In order to understand the interconnected changes taking place between the rural and 
urban sphere in China, as well as the negotiation of the rural graduates social identity we must 
look at how the processes and discourses on modernity and human quality affect the rural 
graduates. This opens up for an analysis on how the diverse arenas expose various outlooks 
and strategies in coping with their life in the world. Furthermore, this also makes us aware of 
how these new outlooks are made relevant among the graduates and used to understand their 
choices and actions.  
Through my analyses I argue that rural graduates by migrating to the cities have not 
only created new economic strategies for themselves but have also come to act as agents of 
                                                 
1
 By China I mean the People’s Republic of China (PRC), not to be confused with the Republic of China, also 
called Taiwan. 
2
 By underemployment I mean: ‘Dependency on involuntary part-time work, intermittent unemployment, and 
involvement in poorly remunerated labour’(Prause and Dooley in Jeffrey, 2010:287)  
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change producing new sociocultural realities that the Chinese state have to deal with. In order 
to avoid the ‘in-between-position’ rural graduates find themselves in when arriving in the city, 
they often try to find new social spaces where they can claim an urban affiliation. It is at the 
borders we find the dynamics of the increasingly complex interpretations of the relationships 
between rurality, urbanity and modernity. It is through analysing the rural graduates situation 
that we come to comprehend how the Chinese state manifest itself in the structures shaping 
the modern and urban subject, as well as how it is conceived and reflected upon in people`s 
everyday practise in creating a meaningful life and to secure upward social mobility. During 
the course of my thesis I argue for a new rationality of governing and subject formation in 
China, where the subjects have become self-governing. ‘Improve myself’ have become the 
phrase among the youths in achieving this goal. This has also lead to a change among young 
rural graduates towards a more individualistic lifestyle and perception of life in contrast to 
earlier collective communities.  
To contextualize and make theoretical sense of the rural graduates’ narratives I first 
provide a brief overview of the educational history in China, before going into details about 
the rural graduates. Following this I present the theoretical framework for my analysis 
throughout this thesis. Then I present my methodology as well as limitations and advantages 
experienced in the field. Lastly I give an outline of the chapters in this thesis.  
 
Educational history of China 
Unemployment or underemployment among university graduates is not a new phenomenon, 
nor is it restricted to China. As early as 1976 Dore argued for a ‘diploma disease’ (1976) in 
England, while Collins (1979) analysed what he labelled the ‘credential society’, where one 
used credentials from schools as a badge of ones abilities. Also in India there have been 
studies done on the growing unemployment rate among graduates (Jeffrey, 2010, Jeffrey et 
al., 2008). In this section I present a brief overview of the relationship between the role of 
education in China and the recent phenomenon of underemployment to grasp the implications 
for the rural graduates in Xiwang Cun.  
Education has always played a central role in China where it has been seen as a 
method to change the inequalities between rural and urban areas (Hsu, 2008)3. In 1949 the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Mao Zedong came to power which change the role of 
                                                 
3
 This is not to say that I support the notion suggesting that ‘educational desire’ is something that comes from 
Confucian culture, thereby making Chinese culture more prone to succeed than others. Kipnis (2011) warns 
against this and gives an explanation to the conflict brought about with these two views in his book 
‘Governing Educational Desire’ (2011). 
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education. Whereas in imperial times education was only assigned sons from a few, wealthy 
families, things changed during the first period of the CCP. Now it was a person’s political 
status that decided whether or not one would get access to higher education. There were no 
school fees, but as jobs were assigned through the direct job assignment system , a part of the 
state-owned work units (danwei), there was no freedom to choose careers (Bai, 2006:137).  
This continued until the beginning of the ‘Cultural Revolution’ (1966-1976)4, which 
required all students in the cities to go out to the countryside to learn from the ‘true workers’. 
Socialist values could not be reached through books, only hard work. What followed was 
persecution of all perceived ‘anti-revolutionary forces’, and unknown numbers of academics 
were systematically executed or sent to labour camps to be ‘re-educated’(Spence, 1991). The 
radicalism of the revolution also temporarily ended formal education in China, by removing 
exams and devaluating higher education (Murphy, 2004:6). It was not until after 1976 that 
China began to restore its educational system under the parole: ‘strengthening the country 
through the promotion of science, technology and education’ (Bai, 2006:138).  
As a part of president Deng Xiaoping’s ‘opening up and reform’-gaige kaifang- in the 
1980`s, several large societal reforms where implemented. In 1995 the danwei system shifted 
to a system where state-owned units no longer dominated urban economies due to the shutting 
down of non-profitable companies, migrants moved to cities in search of work, and college 
graduates looked for employment on their own instead of receiving state-directed job 
assignments5. Moreover, in 1999 the Chinese government decided to open up the educational 
system, increasing the enrolment by 40%, and making higher education more accessible 
through marketization (Bai, 2006:131). At the same time there was more focus on suzhi 
jiaoyu - education for quality- throughout the educational system. This was supposed to 
reflect old Confucian thoughts of the improvement of the human quality, and thereby the 
state, which will be discussed in chapter two. 
 As a result of the reforms in the 1990`s there was once again a widespread belief in 
credentials as a means for social mobility in China. Both parents and the state were doing 
their best to cultivate their children to improve or maintain their social standing in what was 
                                                 
4
 The majority of graduates today are children of the ‘Cultural Revolution’ generation and  many argue that they 
have to make up for their parents lost dreams, hence the strong focus on education (Croll, 2006).  
5
 This ‘shattering of the iron rice bowl’ also had consequences for the millions of workers who were thought to 
have secured ‘cradle to grave’ welfare, which now resulted in the first wave of unemployment in post-Mao 
China (Hughes, 1998). 
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becoming a gradually more competitive society6 (Stockman, 2000, Kipnis, 2003, Fong, 2004). 
At the same time young people`s attitudes toward education have changed along with the role 
of the universities and the market. The relatively few, hardworking students that made it to 
college in the 1990s knew they would not be assigned to a workplace for life. Instead they 
were armed with their diplomas and knowledge that they were the highest educated persons in 
China, supported by a country who relied on their knowledge to become modern (Hoffman, 
2010). They had, and still have their own visions of success and expected some kind of capital 
remuneration from their educational credentials. Yet, this did not necessarily coincide with 
university or state policies ‘encouraging graduates to return home or with employers’ 
definitions of quality and assets’ (Hoffman, 2010:47).  
At the same time as education is viewed as a possible stepping stone up the social 
hierarchy, it has also been seen as a key factor to ‘civilize’ the rural areas. As we will get back 
to in chapter two there has for long been a division in the population where rural China has 
been the ‘inappropriate other’, which the modern, urban China mirrors itself against. A side 
effect of this dualism has been the favouring of cities as working places in what Hoffman 
(2001) labelled a ‘hierarchy of desire’, where ‘the cities are, through social imaginaries linked 
to cultural ideals of civility, progress, and opportunity’ (Hoffman, 2001:45). This might 
explain why rural graduates want to move to certain cities, get certain kinds of jobs, construct 
particular urban identities and consume things of the urban sphere as was the case of the rural 
graduates I met in Xiwang Cun outside Beijing. I now turn to describe some characteristics of 
this diverse group of rural graduates that are migrating to the cities hoping to find new 
opportunities and to improve themselves. 
 
Rural graduates in urban areas  
 
‘宁要北京一张床，不要外地一套房’ 
‘Rather have a bed in Beijing, than a suite in the outlands’ 
Saying amongst rural graduates in Xiwang Cun 
 
I started this introduction by saying that my focus for this thesis is rural graduates migrating 
to the cities, in particular to Xiwang Cun outside Beijing. It is very hard to find the exact 
sources of the unemployment rate for graduate students in China. However, estimates shows 
                                                 
6
  Some have argued that education has become such an important part of the society, because: ‘Confucian 
tradition that stresses child-centred values have promoted a sense that the family is the most reliable “welfare 
agency” for its members’ (Rich and Tsui, 2002 in Liu, 2008a:194). 
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that there are approximately 1 million graduates living all over the country in urban villages7, 
100.000 of these are in Beijing. As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter rural graduates 
migrating to the cities and ending up underemployed is a recent phenomenon so little have 
been written about this issue yet. The only example of any academic work is to my knowledge 
the book ‘The Ant Tribe’ (Lian, 2009). ‘The ant tribe’ is a nature metaphor created by Lian to 
describe the many similarities between ants and the hardworking graduate, living in urban 
villages under poor living conditions and struggling to get by despite having an education. His 
description of the hardship that the students endure became a big hit in both national and 
international media in 2009. Likewise, it was also a reminder to the Chinese government on 
the growing unemployment challenge the country was facing. Even if it is a catchy metaphor, 
I will refrain from using it in this thesis as I argue in chapter two that this label makes it easier 
to connect the rural graduates with something that is ‘out of control’ and that need help to 
become ‘civilized’. Furthermore, as migrants the rural graduates are not entitled to the same 
legal rights as permanent urban residents and they experience pervasive discrimination. Thus I 
believe to use the notion of an ‘ant tribe’ re-establishes the ‘otherness’ of people migrating to 
the city. Moreover, and maybe most important, is that neither my interlockers nor any of the 
people that I met during my fieldwork referred to themselves as ‘ants’ or considered any 
belonging to an ‘ant tribe’. 
 Certain characteristics have been set by Lian (2009) for the group of rural graduates 
based on his survey from 2007-2009. First of all they have a full degree, either bachelor or 
masters, from college or university. Second of all they earn less than 2000 Yuan8 a month, 
which is less than an average migrant wage. Thirdly, the average age is between 22-28 years 
old, of which 90% are of the 80’s generation. Lastly, they often live in peri-urban areas in 
urban villages where the cost of living is low. These characteristics are useful to get an 
understanding of rural graduates. Nevertheless, I often found during my fieldwork that 
educational level and economic income did not always correspond to the extremely diverse 
categories that rural graduates in Beijing find themselves in. Some people had higher 
education from private institutions, while others had different vocational training, and they all 
considered themselves to be educated people. Also the division between someone who earned 
2000 Yuan and someone who earned 3000 Yuan was small when taken in the context of their 
social standing. The fact that they lived in Xiwang Cun was maybe the biggest similarity 
                                                 
7
 Urban village is a form of informal settlement, either in or on the fringe of the city, which I will come back to 
in chapter one. 
8
 2000 Yuan = ca 1870 NOK 
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between them. To sum up, my main objection to the characteristics set above is that rural 
graduates are a categorization of people with very diverse socio-economic and regional 
backgrounds, who live and interact with non-educated migrants, making also them a natural 
part of my ‘field’, though not my main focus. 
The family backgrounds of the rural graduates were often the same. Either they had 
parents who were farmers or migrants, or had parents that could be classified as below 
‘middle class’, by this I mean neither farmer nor migrants. Initially education had been a way 
for their parents to invest in their future security, but also a way for the graduates themselves 
‘to get somewhere’, and ‘to improve themselves’. But as Bourdieu (1984) suggest in his work 
from France, sometimes there are no correlations between the different capitals, higher 
education does not necessarily lead to economic capital in terms of prestige and authority. 
This was also the case for my interlockers. As mentioned above, a university graduate’s start-
up salary is on average 2000 Yuan a month. A migrant worker without the same qualifications 
often earns the same and in some cases more, with an average of around 2500-3000 Yuan a 
month. This has made people ask themselves whether it was worth all that time at university 
when they were losing out on the labour market against migrant workers who have more work 
experience than them.   
During my fieldwork I always asked people why they had decided to migrate to the 
city. Everyone replied that they came to find work, but also that it was important for them to 
experience the city’9. Their urban desires could not be achieved from their rural villages 
therefore the possibility to migrate to the city was a chance they did not want to miss. Because 
of this it was not, at least in the beginning, so important what kind of job they got or how high 
their salary was. This is similar to what Hoffman (2001) describes from Dalian, where newly 
graduated students preferred being in the city where the opportunities were perceived to be 
plentiful and this also gave them a chance to be in an environment where one were more 
likely to succeed in the labour market.   
While the initial perception of the city as being full of opportunities and the only place 
where rural graduates felt they could follow their dreams, this picture quickly lost its gloss. 
Many of my interlockers later confided in me that the jobs they had were both tiring and 
boring, and they often wanted to go back home to their places of origin. I argue that upon 
arriving in the city they would often be faced with what I call a ‘double exclusion’. First of 
                                                 
9
  Yan (2009) also makes similar observations in his work when he asked his informants, who were ‘normal’ 
migrants, what was the point of coming to the cities when they could barely make it? ‘In their own words; it 
is to ‘kan shijie’, and ‘zhang jianshi’( to see the world and to enrich one`s knowledge and experience)’ (ibid. , 
2009: xxviii:) 
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all, many where told that their university degrees where not of the quality expected for the 
jobs they applied for. That is to say that the diploma from a provincial university did not 
possess the same status as for example a diploma from one of the more recognized 
universities in the big cities. Second of all, there remains a strong preconception of the 
influence your birth place has on your character in China. Strong stereotypes have developed 
based on where people are from, people of certain provinces are considered to be thieves or 
lazy, while others are looked upon as more bright and clever10. Often this is called wenhua 
suzhi- cultural quality, and can be compared to social capital described by Bourdieu (1984). 
The notion of suzhi- human quality- and its implication for Chinas modernization will be 
elaborated in chapter two, and this I shall also return to in a couple of pages.  
The consequences of the two factors described above have led to a situation where 
rural graduates often end up at the bottom of the social hierarchy arriving in the cities. 
Without the right social capital they cannot get access to the white collar labour market and as 
more migrants arrive in the city the pressure on the job market increase. The result is that 
many of them end up with unstable short-term jobs, long working hours and low salaries. 
Therefore, working in cities does not necessarily bring much financial gain for the rural 
students. Moreover many of my interlockers seemed to consume almost all of their salary in 
an attempt to blend in with the urban lifestyle11. In addition the majority of the rural graduates 
that I met did not send money back to their parents, because they did not earn enough to 
support themselves, and some even received monetary support from their parents in the 
countryside. The consequence of the changing patterns of money remittance is something we 
will come back to in chapter five.  
It is important to consider the historical background for the discourses on modernity 
and human quality in China to understand the present and the future expectations of the 
students. Thus, I now outline my theoretical framework based on the works of Foucault  and 
his ideas on ‘governmentality’(2003[1978]), before applying the complimentary position of 
the individualization thesis proposed by Beck (1992) and revised by Yan (2009) to fit Chinese 
conditions. These analytical perspectives will be useful tools in grasping why the graduates 
blame themselves for their failures and successes, instead of the party-state, and how new 
                                                 
10
 Stereotypes like this can be found everywhere in the world, but in China there are very strong notions about 
the connection between place of birth and your character. Some informants of mine claimed that since they 
were born in the same place as Confucius this automatically had a positive impact on their nature. This was 
confirmed by other people present around the table that were envying her for her good background. 
Moreover, the perception of who could be identified as the ‘bad wolf’ also changed from province to 
province. 
11
 This is also observed by Yan (2009) among young villagers migrating to the cities.  
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tools of government have been developed and how they have pushed modern subjects in 
China to realize individualistic qualities.  
 
State and governmentality  
I argue that my ethnographic account of Chinese rural graduates challenge the frequently 
repeated mantra of Western discourses on post-socialist transition; with an opening of the 
market and a capitalistic market system people will be ‘free’ from the ‘sticky chains’ of the 
state. As recent studies on dwindling post-socialist states and daily news reports from former 
socialist satellites show it is necessary to question this linear transitional development story, 
as the complexities and uncertainties of culturally specific constellations and power 
organizations are surfacing in these transitional societies. Instead of taking for granted the 
above mentioned assumptions some are arguing that while the state retreat, it is being 
replaced by the market, and that we are in some areas witnessing emerging modes of social 
domination, strong political tensions, fragmenting national-states, and in the most extreme 
cases, ethnic cleansing12.  
The previously mentioned reforms by Deng Xiaoping led Western countries both 
hoping and expecting that by raising the bamboo curtain increased individual freedom from 
the state would occur, which in turn could also mean democratic political reforms. A closer 
look at empirical works on China from the last 15-20 years reveals a different story. Since the 
80’s many scholars have analysed the symbolic processes and every day practises that attempt 
to bring the ‘state’ back in society, and arguing that the ‘state’ is still present through different 
levels in society despite the introduction of the market (Zhang, 2001b). Pieke (2004) have 
also states that the Chinese state should not be taken as something above society. It should be 
investigated as an actor of power and authority that is successful in creating unity or 
separateness, and is a practical reality in people`s everyday life (Pieke, 2004:518). However, 
he is also criticising scholars like Gupta (1995), Ferguson and Gupta (2002) and Trouillot 
(2001) for imagining the state as a loose system of bureaucratic rules that have been shaped 
through historical discourses (Pieke, 2004:518). I agree with Pieke and therefore ground my 
analysis on how the state is practised rather focusing on it as a set entity. This allows us to 
study the state at the intersections at places like Xiwang Cun where the state is seemingly not 
present, but where we still can analyse how it works through the individuals. This will be very 
important for me in this thesis as both Hoffman (2010) and Rofel (1999) points out that rather 
                                                 
12
 See for example Burawoy and Verdery (1999), Soliman (2011),Hoffman (2010) and Sigley (2006). 
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than experiencing strong state-directed governance in the management of the population there 
is now an adoption of new tools of governance encouraging self-governance (Hoffman, 
2010:9-10, Rofel, 1999). As a result of the theoretical quandaries above, I find it necessary to 
view the dialectic relationship between my interlockers in Xiwang Cun and the state as ‘a 
fluid process of discourse and practice’ (Yan, 2009:14).  
Employing the concept of governmentality developed by Foucault (2003[1978]) will be 
a particularly useful approach as this will help to move beyond some of the traditional 
dichotomies of the state, and will also allow the discovery of forms of power that 
conventional state-centric approaches miss (Greenhalgh and Winckler, 2005:205). By 
governmentality I mean: 
 
the conduct of conduct- that is, to all those more or less calculated and 
systematic ways of thinking and acting that aim to shape, regulate, or manage the 
comportment of others (….) Understood this way, “government” designates not 
just the activities of the state and its institutions but more broadly any rational 
effort to influence or guide the conduct of human beings through acting upon their 
hopes, desires, circumstances, or environment.  
                    (Inda, 2005:2)  
 
Even if Foucault as a philosopher based his notion of governmentality on the history of 
Europe many scholars have found it useful as an analytical tool in the case of China13. I argue 
in chapter two that the party-state has shifted its way of governing from direct intervention in 
the population to creating self-governed individuals. This has been made possible through the 
disintegration of the danwei system, mentioned earlier, where university graduates along with 
the rest of the work force were assigned jobs. Today on the other hand the students are 
encouraged to seek their own opportunities in the growing economy of China ‘creating their 
own rice bowls’(Hoffman, 2010).  
 
Self-conduct and suzhi- human quality 
In today’s China there is an expectation of the subject to focus on being the self-enterprising 
individual who is rational, autonomous and free to choose whatever he or she wants. Yet, the 
formation of this new, modern subject in post-Mao China does not signify the end of 
governmental concern. As we learnt earlier young educated people’s visions of success and 
what to do was not always the same as what the party-state wanted them to do. As the market 
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 See for example Ong (1999), Greenhalgh and Winckler (2005), Hoffman (2010) and  Jacka (2006) . 
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opened up with the liberalization process in the 1980’s it created a potential problem for the 
public morality as it could be degraded in the meeting with capitalism. The party-leaders 
worried that this could have a domino-effect on China’s march towards progress and 
modernity, according to Bakken (2000:110-114). It therefore became important for the 
government to create new tools of government that could guide the graduates in internalizing 
the state demands for social stability to ensure economic growth, also called ‘socialism from 
afar’ (Zhang and Ong, 2008).  
Now, a person with modern qualities should both embody the values of a free 
neoliberal subject; such as striving forwards, be competitive and independent, and at the same 
time possess the collectivistic values of socialism (Liu, 2008a:196-197). As have been noted 
by Hoffman (2010) this kind of regime presupposes an authority of the party-state to guide 
and help the individuals in their construction of a high quality self. This tool of governing by 
encouraging self-governance can be understood through another concept created by Foucault, 
namely ‘technologies of the self’(2003[1978]). This concept refers to ‘self-steering 
mechanisms, or the ways in which individual’s experience, understand, judge and conduct 
themselves’ (Rose, 1996:135). Yet, Rose (1996) points out that this should be interpreted in 
the direction that the subjects are caught up in an Foucaultian web, without any means to 
resist or react (1996:140). Liu (1998) expands on this and note that it rather ‘opens up 
potential spaces for individuals, who are active agents, to reinterpret, play with, combine, 
resist or accept the multiple technologies of subjectification simultaneously directed to them’ 
(2008:195). I argue that this concept of self-governance gives us an excellent opening to 
understand how young, rural graduates in Beijing experience, react, relate to and shape their 
choices and challenges in Xiwang Cun.  
I argue in this thesis that self-governance have to be viewed in relation to the term 
suzhi. Hard to translate and its meaning differ according to the context it is applied to, but in 
its most crude translation it can be understood as human quality. According to Kipnis (2006) 
suzhi has both Confucian and Social Darwinist associations. Confucianism has from early on 
highlighted education as a tool to raise the moral quality of the individual, while in the other 
sense, as also Anagnost (1997) describes, there is the logic of China`s population holding the 
party-state back from reaching modernity and it is therefore important to raise the populations 
quality, especially the younger generation (Kipnis, 2006:10). This has also made the 
individuals responsible for the future of the nation, and ‘that a person lacks ‘quality’ is often 
connected to the respective background of the subjects as ‘peasants’ or other ‘uncultured’ 
people‘ (Kipnis, 2006:11). Hence, the individual has a personal responsibility to improve 
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itself to raise not only ones own quality, but also the nation’s quality. This is something that 
we will get back to in chapter two when we analyse the discourses that have constructed these 
notions.  
Today, the term suzhi is frequently used within the political and academic elite to 
evaluate individuals attributes along a low and high-quality scale, which had implications for 
one`s worth. The result is that suzhi is increasingly connected to the maximization of 
capabilities and values of the human body (Liu 2008:197), which then again are connected to 
academic-attributes (Bakken, 2000, Fong, 2004). Moreover, in line with the educational 
reforms that we looked into earlier, there has been a rush to attain diplomas from higher-
education institutions in the reform era followed by high expectations of where their papers 
can lead them on the social ladder.  
To sum up, the party-state is only providing tools for the individuals to reach their 
goals in becoming good neoliberal subjects. However, since the individual have been given 
the freedom of choice they are also solely responsible for both their successes and failures. As 
long as the party-state is improving the conditions for its population and providing the tools 
for further cultivation, the individual should have full faith in the state as well, because it is 
through the individuals own cultivation that China can reach civilization and modernity. This 
creates two systems with conflicting values, which also embrace and frame the life situation 
of the rural graduates in Xiwang Cun. We learn more about the discourse of modernity and 
quality in China in chapter two, which lay the foundation for the rest of the thesis as we 
follow the rural graduates on different arenas. 
 With our now increased understanding of governmentality and human conduct in 
China I move on to outline the individualization thesis proposed by Beck (1992) and modified 
by Yan (2009, 2010). I argue that this is a fruitful approach in recognizing the implications of 
expectations of individual freedom, actions and choices made by rural graduates in 
negotiation with the state and the emergence of new collectives, as I show in chapter five.  
 
The individualization thesis 
The typical picture of China for many people is a collectively, uniform mass of people 
governed with an iron fist; the opposite of that is defined as the free, individualistic Western 
individual. Traditionally, China has been theoretizised as a collective society14 where the 
interests of the collective were placed higher than the individuals. The individual was 
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considered to be a brick in the larger, collective puzzle ideologically supporting the family 
and thereby the state, not visa versa (Yan, 2009). Moreover, the individual have been 
understood as an extension of its family and kin-relations in a concentric network, not as a 
single social unit on its own (Fei et al., 1992). Much water has passed under the bridge since 
then and today the situation is different and what is considered to be close relations are 
changing, as I demonstrate in chapter five. The individual is now promoted as an independent 
social unit in China, but how are we to understand this apparent shift from the collective to 
the individual? I argue the individualization thesis can provide us with some analytical tools 
which are useful when considering this transformation.  
A theoretical approach to the individualization process can be traced back to the end of 
the 1970`s in Europe where one tried to explain individualization as a result of the social 
processes taking place. People were pushing for social justice and rights for the individual 
protected by a democracy, and taken care of by the welfare state. Beck (1992) sees 
individualization as ‘the beginning of a new mode of societalization, a kind of 
“metamorphosis” or “categorical shift” in the relation between the individual and society’ 
(1992:127[original emphasis]), which have disembedded and liberated the individual from 
former traditional categories like family and kin-relations, class and gender. Expanding on 
this model of individualization Beck together with Beck-Gernsheim (2002) takes into account 
a structural aspect in which this process does not take place through the agency of the 
individual, hence arguing that; ‘One of the decisive features of the process of 
individualization is precisely that it not merely permits but demands an active contribution by 
individuals’ (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2010:xi). This is also one of my main arguments 
throughout this thesis, as the rural graduates are participating in the urban society, caught up 
in discourses on modernity and population quality they are not only trying to disembed 
themselves from their rural roots but also trying to reembed into the urban and global culture.  
According to Yan (2010) the individualization thesis can be summed up in four points; 
(1) a disembedment from cultural traditions like for example family, kinship and community, 
(2) compelling people to be proactive and self-determinate with full responsibility for 
themselves,  paradoxically creating a deeper embedment into the overarching institutions, (3) 
individuals must construct a life though guidelines and regulations, hence a life of conformity, 
and lastly (4) ‘cultural democratization’ which means that democracy is accepted and 
practised in everyday relations (Yan, 2010:4). This said, how fitting is the European model in 
the case of China, where one has not experienced the same socio-political processes? 
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A rising individual 
  
Chinese individualization process has its own distinctive profile: it does not 
simply represent a copy of the European path of individualization but must be 
understood as Chinese-style individualization 
    (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002:xviii) 
 
There is, in principle, a close connection between individualization and the state in both the 
European and the Chinese contexts. Though, unlike the West where the market functioned as 
the primary mover behind the rise of the individual and the transformation of the private 
sphere into a more intimate domain, in China it had been the party-state that created such 
changes by enforcing a number of top-down institutional changes to build the new socialist 
person and society. The role of the party-state in shaping the individual remained strong and 
consistent across the dividing year of 1978, albeit in different forms and in different directions 
before and after the post-Mao reforms. The individual arose by responding to these 
institutional changes rather than pursing her or his inalienable right through a bottom-up 
approach. As a result, while taking advantage of the new laws, state policies and institutional 
changes, individuals have accepted that constrains imposed by the party- state and have 
internalized the party-state`s proscribed directions for the development of the individual under 
state socialism. The entire process can be called ‘managed individualization’ (Yan, 
2009:xxxi).  
The individualization process in China is not occurring within an institutionally 
secured framework and based on the civil, political and basic social rights which were won 
through political struggles as happened in Europe. Instead the very thing which sets the 
Chinese process of individualization apart is the fact that these goals are still objects of 
struggles whose outcomes remain open. Furthermore, there is a difference between 
individualism and individualization in China. While individualization of the Chinese society 
is a process which forces a disembedding of the individuals into a new, self-reflexive, 
reembedded institutionalized reality, it does not necessarily mean that Chinese have become 
more individualized in the European sense. This sets the baseline for my thesis where I, 
through analysing my ethnographic material from Xiwang Cun, argue that while we can 
observe a rising individual it is not automatically followed by an individualization of Chinese 
society, creating a ‘Chinese style of individualisation’ (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 
2010:xviii). I outline and analyse these processes of a rising individual on several levels; the 
development and negotiation of the individual self in the meeting with the urban in chapter 
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three, the individual constructing and consuming a urban membership through new social 
spaces in chapter four, and lastly in chapter five the disembedment from external social 
constraints.  
 
Methodology 
This thesis is based on a six months anthropological fieldwork in Beijing, China. Having 
studied and worked in the country three years prior to starting my master`s program I had 
already built up a network before leaving Norway. One month was spent on preliminary 
research in Shanghai and Beijing, where I had worked and lived for one year and half a year 
respectively. This preliminary research was conducted to map out where I could get the best 
access, and what areas would answer my research questions in the best possible way. After 
deciding on Beijing due to its unique position in geopolitics in China, I spent the last five 
months in Xiwang Cun, an urban village of rural migrants and graduates on the fringe of the 
capital.  
I hoped to get in contact with potential interlockers through applying the snowballing 
method using my existing network, but I soon realized that I additionally needed to seek other 
ways to establish contact. Almost everyone I knew, and their extended network, was aware of 
the phenomenon I was talking about, but nobody seemed to know any anything more about 
the rural graduates. The ‘invisible’ presence is a suitable picture of how the millions of 
migrants living in Beijing are thought of. Since it took some time before I ‘found my field’ I 
considered other alternatives for my research. There were many stories about ‘the rat tribe’, 
migrants living in basements and air-defence shelters under substandard living conditions, and 
I did undertake a couple of surveys, but after being refused to enter different basements by old 
women guarding the entrances I discarded the idea.  
In order to get in contact with potential informants I eventually got a job through 
contacts in a Chinese research and development company which worked on outsourced 
projects from big international companies. It is outside the scope of this thesis to elaborate on 
the broader picture of the information acquired through this work, but it has still provided me 
with important information on the situation young migrants are facing in Beijing today, their 
motivation for coming and the nuances between my main informants in Xiwang Cun and the 
view on Xiwang Cun from the outside.  
Moreover, I had several friends and contacts working in media related businesses. 
They provided me with interesting angles to the thesis and one of them also introduced me to 
Xiwang Cun. This person was doing research for a follow up on Tangjialing, the urban village 
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described in chapter one. By being ‘introduced’ to parts of Xiwang Cun through him I was 
able to establish some contacts that were later to become my interlockers.  
In Xiwang Cun I conducted participant observation through following my interlockers 
on different arenas and places, joining them in their daily chores, sometimes helping out in the 
different shops, going out for dinners and so on. I quickly realised that I could obtain more 
information through engaging in conversations and chores with my interlockers, than through 
organizing interviews. However, since many looked at me as a teacher there were many 
situation that had the form like semi-structured interviews with open ended questions. I had a 
small black book which served as a note book where I occasionally wrote down keywords 
from conversations or got my interlockers to write down things when I did not understand 
them correctly. In addition to being useful nodes when writing up my field notes in the 
evening, I would also argue that it created a more vertical relationship between me and them. 
This also means that since most of the quotations found in my thesis are based on these notes 
from semi-structured interviews and open-ended conversations they are not written down in 
the exact manner as they were uttered, but I would argue that they are still very close to the 
actual conversations. To protect my interlockers, their names and the names of places are 
changed throughout the thesis. 
I also engaged passively in Chinese chat forums and web pages designed for, or 
created by rural graduates in China. This allowed me to gain a greater insight into topics that 
mattered for the rural graduates as well as to gain more information on the general situation of 
graduates in China. Later the chat forum also became a way for me to keep in contact with 
some of my interlockers. 
Furthermore, semi-structured interviews with relevant actors within state institutions 
were conducted in Beijing. In addition I have also drawn on material such as written reports, 
documents, newspaper articles, and so on to gain a broader understanding of the public 
discourse and representation of migrants, and in particular rural graduates.  
 
Limitations and advantages in the field 
The site of my fieldwork was an urban village which was viewed by the Chinese authorities 
as an unwanted product of the urbanization and market reforms. As a result, my study was 
considered something important to know more about, but it was also situated in the grey zone 
of what was politically acceptable and not. This was particularly the issue after Tangjialing15 
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 A previous urban village of rural graduates that we will learn more about in chapter one. 
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was torn down and the Arabic spring movement evolved in the Middle East. The problematic 
situation of the graduates made my ethnographic account even more politicized. This became 
even clearer in conversations with representatives from the Chinese ministry who viewed my 
research with great interest, but considered my theme to balance on the edge of what was ok 
or not from an official point of view. Since I was not affiliated with any official Chinese 
institution or university this also proved to be a problem of accountability for them. As an 
outsider this could pose a potential threat if I found something that put the government in an 
unfavourable light. Halskov Hansen (2006) points out that there are many positive effects of 
having affiliations with local institutions, since it is easier to gain access to libraries, official 
archive material, possible support from local cadres and access to interviewing officials. This 
said, this kind of official approval, if I had gotten one, could have introduced me to the above 
mentioned spheres, but would not necessarily have opened any doors among my interlockers 
who almost exclusively were illegal subjects in the city and thereby might have been ‘scared 
off’ by official red stamps.  
When entering the field several challenges arose. The rental market in Xiwang Cun 
was already saturated due to the continuous stream of rural graduates seeking cheap 
accommodation, but I was lucky to meet a landlord on my first day that agreed to rent me a 
room once he had something available. He almost bragged that he was one of the few that 
could rent out to foreigners since he had good connections-guanxi, with the local police. Two 
weeks later I moved in on the condition that I did not speak with or ask any questions to 
anyone in my building. Normally anyone moving around or visiting China should always 
register at the police in less than 24 hours upon arrival. This was not the practice in Xiwang 
Cun. I, for example, was only registered in the accounts of my landlord, which also was the 
case of other people I met.  This arrangement made it easier for both the migrants to move on 
short notice without having to report to the police, and apparently the police would get reports 
from the landlords on how many people they rented out their rooms to, which resulted in less 
work for them.  I also argue that this actually led me to a better understanding of my 
interlockers situation, since I was also ‘floating’ and got to experience how the informal 
arrangements where undertaken in Xiwang Cun. Since it took me almost a month to ‘find’ 
Xiwang Cun I had already established a base at the centre of Beijing where I was registered 
with the police, so all the official papers were in order.  Moreover, this also provided me with 
a place of retreat as well as being a more practical base whenever I was meeting contacts from 
outside Xiwang Cun.  
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Once I had established my field, I realized the difficulty in creating and finding 
suitable ‘meeting places’ with potential informants. As a researcher without a locally 
recognized productive role, I felt awkward in the beginning approaching people on the street. 
Still, after hanging out in the same areas day after day trying to establish contact with people 
my efforts proved fruitful.  People started to ask me questions on where I was from and what I 
was doing in the area. In this process I managed to establish a role for myself in the 
community and as I got included in my interlockers’ networks other people also accepted my 
presence. Moreover, I would sometimes look after my informants shops while they were 
away, or help out with the handling money for others and so on, which would also create 
interview settings that proved more rewarding than the more formal situations. For some 
people I was the first Westerner they had seen and many were completely dumb-struck when 
they also realized that I spoke Chinese. Many people I met, including many of my informants, 
commented on this when we got to know each other better. They were curious to know what 
was “normal” in the West, how do you this and how do you do that. This also gave some 
people the opportunity to show that they knew more than others and that I could either 
confirm or deny what they were saying. In many situations I became the one that gave face to 
my informants in the meeting with people above or amongst peers showing that they were 
knowledgeable people.  
Depending on the context, I was sometimes a casual English teacher to some of the 
interlockers, which gave me an excellent opportunity to ask questions in a natural setting, 
while other times especially in the later part my fieldwork I would often be referred to as lao 
pengyou-old friend- by some informants, symbolizing a closer and older connection. Others, 
especially some of the boys I hung out with, would call me jiejie, older sister. This created 
roles that made our interaction more natural for third parties as well as justifying why I was 
associating with them. I believe that had I been younger, in most cases I was the same or a 
couple of year older than my informants, this would have posed a challenge for me hanging 
alone together with boys. Furthermore, there were incidents where my informants constructed 
a common history to validate and make our relationship more legit for other people that did 
not know us. In China the concept of guanxi, or networks, is something that stands strong (see 
for example Yang 1996, Kipnis 2003). And, as in most human relationships, reciprocity is 
important, meaning that they are all to a certain degree based on some kind of mutual 
understanding that both parties will benefit in some way. However, for my interlockers I soon 
proved to be ‘empty guanxi’ since I did not have any network they could use and I did not 
want to start business with them in Norway.  What I could give them was language lessons 
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and the social status of having me (a Westerner) as a friend or in their network. I was still a 
symbol of the West and the modern, which sometimes put me in awkward positions where I 
felt I had to maintain the face of informants that stood in a horizontal relationship to each 
other.  
On a couple of occasions I was also accused of having an agenda other than doing 
fieldwork. On some of these occasions it was because I had such a good understanding of 
local conditions and knew things that foreigners were not supposed to know about. This could 
be simple things like geographical knowledge, Chinese proverbs or awareness of local 
conditions in China that were due to my previous years of experience in China. But to some I 
was simply too knowledgeable and hence in several instances had to deflect accusations of 
being a spy. 
One of the reasons I picked Beijing over Shanghai was the language. Even if I had 
worked in Shanghai a year earlier, I had only managed to pick up some phrases of the local 
dialect/language, and I was afraid that with migrants coming from the surrounding provinces 
language would be a barrier for me.  Furthermore, I had worked in Beijing for half a year on 
an earlier occasion and therefore knew from experience that it was much easier to get around 
there with my mandarin- Putonghua (book language), than in Shanghai.  Since I had studied 
in Yunnan for 1 ½ years I held a high level of Chinese, and therefore managed well without a 
translator, as people were also more than happy to explain words to me if I did not 
understand. Furthermore, some of my main informants happened to come from Yunnan where 
I had lived earlier, so I could understand and speak some of the local dialect from that area. 
This, combined with my local knowledge of their homes, created a stronger connection 
between us. 
 Finally, being a young, single woman alone in an urban village can bring about some 
challenges when ‘working the field’.  Often, and especially in the beginning, since I was alone 
and eager to talk to people, men that I met often mistook me as coming on to them, since 
traditionally women in their perception were not supposed to interact or approach strangers. 
This could only mean one thing and that was, despite my continuous explanation that I was an 
anthropology student interested in the situation of rural graduates, that I was searching for 
romance. Zhang also notes this challenge from her fieldwork in Zhejiang Cun, an earlier 
migrant enclave in Beijing, and how; ‘Even as an ethnographer, I could not escape the local 
assumption about gendered boundaries and moral codes’ (Zhang, 2001b:216).  
  
What follows 
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My line of approach in the chapters to follow begins with an introduction of Xiwang Cun an 
urban village in chapter one, home for thousands of rural graduates in the peri-urban area of 
Beijing. The village characteristics and organizational structures are described, as well as the 
brief discussion on the spatial ambiguity that Xiwang Cun is seen as representing in relations 
to modern Beijing. In chapter 2 I focus on the state and look at how the two discourses 
civilization –wenming- modernity and human quality –suzhi have been constructed and 
understood by the party-state. I demonstrate how the media, who represent the state, then, 
communicate the situation with underemployed rural graduates in the city. In chapter three I 
change my perspective from a top-down to a bottom-up approach and focus on the individuals 
in Xiwang Cun. Here I analyse how state politics of human quality have been internalized by 
my interlockers and is reflected in their quest to ‘improve themselves’ and how their social 
identity is negotiated on different arenas. Chapter four shows how consumption of places has 
become an important marker of urban belonging. By focusing on the introduction of fast-food 
chains in China I analyse the negotiation of an urban and global identity which is ‘self-made’. 
From here, I change focus to the everyday realities on the ground for the rural graduates. We 
follow the process of establishing a business in Xiwang Cun and how the notion of becoming 
a successful ‘petty trader’, both embodies the rural graduates negotiations of ‘improving 
themselves’, as well as it reflects the changing the role of family and kin as providing and 
arranging for the self-realization of the individual. Finally, in the last I highlight some 
arguments and observations that have been central throughout this thesis. 
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1 Xiwang Cun – an urban village 
Beijing, January 2011. It was still cold as I walked through the vast, apocalyptic 
landscape of the former urban village Tangjialing. The sound of scavengers 
hammering on piles of debris from the previous settlement could be heard from a 
distance. A stray dog barked at me as I passed a lonely, red banner hanging 
between two trees, promoting; ‘peaceful development and civilized society’.  
 
Tangjialing had during the last five years grown from being a small village of 3000 locals, 
exploding into a bustling hive of more than 50.000 migrants in 2010 (Lian, 2009). The 
majority of the newcomers were rural graduate students who had moved to the city to seek 
new opportunities. In general, urban villages like Tangjialing are a growing phenomenon in 
large cities in China and they have created many controversies in city development projects 
over the last decade (Tian, 2008:283, Liu et al., 2010, Zhang et al., 2003). What was special 
with Tangjialing, however, was the media attention it got both from national and international 
media in the wake of the book ‘The Ant Tribe- a record of a village inhabited by university 
graduates’ (Lian, 2009). In 2010 the book topped the best-seller list in China. It described a 
reality that would have been unimaginable only a decade earlier; groups of rural university 
graduates flocked to the cities with their diplomas in search of a job and a better future. 
Unfortunately for most of them this meant living a life in the urban villages in the peri-urban 
areas of the city with unsanitary conditions and often with underpaid jobs or in the worst case 
–no jobs at all. Despite all this they kept on living in the city, struggling like ants to improve 
their lives, hence the label ‘The Ant Tribe’. 
Local government officials soon understood the serious knock-on effects this could 
had on both their political reputation as well as the social stability of the society. In November 
2010 two government officials visited Tangjialing and publicly cried with the graduate 
students over the struggles and hardships they were going through. They promised to help as 
best they could and showed them support in their quest for a better life and future (CCTV, 
26th March 2010). December 2010 the local government stated that Tangjialing would be 
renovated due to substandard living conditions, citing the risk of fire and other unforeseen 
accidents (China Daily, 17th July 2011). In clear text this meant that the settlement would be 
demolished and the people living there would be forced to move. The potential threat of 
having a whole village of graduates, gathered in one place was seen as too urgent to leave 
‘unattended’.  
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Through this chapter I give an overview of the emergence of urban villages in China, 
before describing Xiwang Cun, an urban village on the outskirts of Beijing and the destination 
for many previous residents of Tangjialing. Through the model of Xiwang Cun I outline the 
characteristics of what is defined as an urban village16 and how daily life is lived there. I also 
discuss shortly how urban villages have come to be highly contested urban spaces of power 
and representation. This forms the backdrop for our understanding of the rural graduates’ 
lives, choices and actions in the following chapters of this thesis.  
 
Conceptualisation of urban villages in China 
As outlined in the introduction the evolving migration policies in China together with an 
opening up of the market made it easier for people to seek their fortune in the cities. The 
country`s recent, rapid entry into the global system under its unique combination of socialism 
and a market economy have led to the growth of urban villages17. These villages are in 
Chinese called chengzhongcun, literally meaning ‘village18 encircled by the city’.  Qi et al. 
(2007:28) conceptualise the chengzhongcun ‘urban village’ in China as ‘rural enclaves 
situated inside large cities or in their peri-urban areas characterized by high building densities, 
poor building quality, irregular streets and open sewage’, while Zhang defines it as ‘an 
informal settlement sheltering rural migrants, conceptualising them as a micro-sites of 
political and economic interactions where government and various social groups compete for 
their vested interests’ (Zhang, 2011:475). In this thesis I employ ‘urban village’ as translation 
for chengzhongcun, to encompass the definitions of both Qi et al. (2007) and Zhang (2011) in 
the understanding of what an urban village is. Moreover, Qi et al.(2007) argue that since the 
word ‘slum’ is not used in China19 it is replaced by the more politically correct term urban 
village, which ‘does bear some truth, since the places are not strictly speaking slums’ (Qi et 
al., 2007:28).  
                                                 
16
 The concept of urban villages in China should not be confused with the western planning idea of  ‘urban 
villages’, where one wishes to create a village feeling in the context of an urban city as see in Western 
countries(see for example Bell and Jayle (2004) or Magnaghi (2005). Nor are the urban village described 
here similar to the social model villages described by Chance (1991) . 
17
 That is not too say that migrant enclaves are something new in Chinas`s history as they did also exist in pre-
1949 Chinese cities, but because of migration control, new migrant enclaves did not appear until after the 
first three decades of socialist rule in China, according to Ma and Xiang (1998:546) 
18
 Li (2006) in Li (2008:28) claim that these places are only ‘’villages’ insofar that they are places where the title 
to the land still belongs to a collective’. 
19
 Qi et al. (2007:28 ) also claim that the word slum does not exist in any official Chinese dictionary and that is 
another reason why it is not used. 
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Figure 1. Urban villages in and around Beijing, 
capital of the People`s republic of China, 2010. 
Source: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/dfpd/2010-
03/12/content_9579087.htm 
In the UN-habitat report ‘The challenge of slums’ (2003), cited by Qi et al. (2007:24) 
and Davis (2006), it is said that China ‘has managed so far to urbanize rapidly without the 
creation of large slum areas or informal settlements’ (2003:126)20. Even if urban villages in 
China have developed under unique conditions, it still shares some similarities with other 
developing countries containing informal settlements, in that they are viewed as ‘backward 
places’ by the city government and as ‘hampering the process of modernization’ (Wu, 
2009:887). Gilbert (2007) is also highly critical towards the term slum as he sees it as ‘an 
oblique invitation to governments to look for instant solutions to insoluble problems’ 
(2007:697). Besides, he argues, ‘governments have always shown a willingness to demolish 
slums despite the fact that experience has shown that policy to be ineffective’ (2007:697). In 
the case of Zhejiang Cun, described by Zhang (2001), it is possible to trace a connection 
between the labelling of ‘a place in need of renovation’ in providing the government with 
political incentives to tear down the area in question.  
In the last decade the topic of urban villages in China has been described extensively 
from different perspectives. Already in 1998 
Ma and Xiang (1998) argued that the villages 
created ‘new ‘urban spaces’ and ‘non-state 
spaces’ (...) producing a new urban mosaic 
that did not exist in Maoist China’ 
(1998:546). Some scholars have provided 
ethnographic investigations into the relational 
network between migrants, the government 
and the villages in larger cities21, others 
have looked at property rights (Tian, 2008), 
the housing market, construction work and 
sanitary conditions (Wang and Wang, 2009), while some try to show that the urban villages 
should be seen as a positive aspect of urbanisation in China and a solution rather than a 
problem (Wang et al., 2009, Ma and Xiang, 1998, Liu et al., 2010). 
                                                 
20
 Qi et al. (2007:30) also argue that urban villages share some important characteristics with informal 
settlements. ‘The term ‘informal settlement’ can refer to a slum, a squatter, or a shanty town. The criteria 
applied by the Chinese government define “settlement areas with informal housing”, although this definition 
does not satisfy all of UN-Habitat`s five indicators. The definition of ‘informal housing- used by the public 
authorities of the district of Yinzhou is, however, not subject to its physical, but to its legal status.’ Qi et 
al.(2007:38) 
21
 See for example  Zhang( 2001b),  Ma and Xiang (1998) or  Liu and Liang (1997) (1997)   
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Figure 2. Basic spatial structure of Beijing. Modified 
from?from ‘Beijing’  (Yang et al., 2011) 
‘The inner urban includes built-up areas and small non-
built up areas. The outer urban is basically rural areas. 
The exurban is mainly areas far away from the urban 
core’(Yang et al., 2011:2).  
Xiwang Cun and other urban villages are interesting fields of study because they 
provide us with a picture of some of the challenges China is facing. Since the migrants cannot 
find a place to stay when they move to the city, urban villages have tacitly been accepted as 
the solution (Smart, 2001, Zhang, 2011). Smart (2001) describe how ‘the toleration policy’ by 
the government in Hong Kong has created an ’informal regulation’ which has led to a 
‘vacuum of regulation’, and in turn has resulted in the emergence of an informal property 
market in the ‘squatter areas’ of Hong Kong (Smart, 2001:41)22. According to Liu et al. 
(2010) this can be seen as positive since; ‘the vacuum of state regulations in the urban villages 
provides a means of subsistence for 
landless villagers and low cost housing for 
migrants’ (Liu et al. 2010, 143.). Hence, 
instead of tearing down the urban villages 
to beautify the city and potentially trigger 
social unrest the areas are ignored and left 
inside or in the peri-urban areas of the city 
(Qi et al. 2007:29). This explains why there 
are still so many urban villages in China 
and that the government does not need to 
‘involve panoptic strategies to know and 
control all (...), it became possible to 
‘govern through rather than in spite of 
individual liberty’ (Osborne and Rose, 
1999:740-741 in Smart, 2001:31). 
There is a strong perception of 
Beijing as the centre for political and 
cultural affairs, which has resulted in a much 
stronger over-all regulatory regime than in 
for example the economical centre of China, Shanghai. This is important to keep in mind 
since my observations have to be seen in relation to the larger geopolitics of the capital. This 
is among other things true for the opening up for migrants, where there is a general perception 
that getting a hukou23, household residential registration, in Beijing is almost impossible, 
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 Qi et al. (2009) also describes the development happening in the urban villages as ‘an informal element in 
Chinese urban growth regulation.’ (Qi et al. 2007:29). 
23
 Households registration system. 
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while in Shanghai it is easier to obtain. Beijing is also supposed to be the role model for the 
rest of China, which is why policies and regulation are, at least on the surface, much better 
taken care of. In Beijing there are approximately 50 urban villages in and on the outskirts of 
the city (Figure 1). Due to the changing nature of these settlements, comprehensive studies 
and surveys of urban villages at a national level are unavailable (Zhang, 2003: 913). The more 
famous villages used to be Zhejiang Cun, Xinjiang Cun, Henan Cun and Tangjialing before 
they were demolished. Most of this happened before the Beijing Olympic Games in 2008 in 
‘the name of disciplining and beautifying urban spaces’ (Zhang, 2011:474). I now zoom in on 
one of the urban villages in Beijing; Xiwang Cun, the student village. 
 
Xiwang Cun 
Xiwang Cun is situated in Changping district in the very north of Beijing. Positioned north of 
Haidian district, the ‘silicon valley’ of China24, Changping district is now striving to become 
the new innovative centre of Beijing and is trying to take advantage of the ‘spill-over’ effect 
from Haidian. At the same time offering cheaper locations and benefits for companies that 
want to establish themselves there. 
Xiwang Cun is a collective term for three villages, which have grown together due to 
rapid urbanization, growing numbers of rural graduate students and the demolition of 
Tangjialing in December 2010. It is hard to give an exact account of number of people living 
in Xiwang Cun since few are registered at the police. Though some estimates show that from 
having almost no migrants before 2009 the population exploded in the following year leading 
up to the present situation with around 3900 local inhabitants with rural hukou registered in 
Xiwang Cun against approximately 45.000 migrants with hukou registered in other places. 
Hence, there are now 11 times more migrants living in Xiwang Cun than there are native 
inhabitants. The majority of the migrants are rural graduate students between the age of 18-30 
years old, whereas only have a local hukou (China Daily, .  
Xiwang Cun is an attractive village to settle down in for the rural graduates for many 
reasons. As mentioned in the beginning the village is close to the high-tech district in Beijing 
where many of the graduate jobs are found. Moreover, with the introduction of a new metro 
line last year the area became more accessible and it was easier to commute to other parts of 
the city. Many graduates that I met and talked to had jobs 1-1/2 hour away, therefore good 
access to public transportation was important for them. Furthermore, it only takes about 45-50 
                                                 
24
 Where national and international technological companies from Huawei to Google have their headquarters and 
also where all the big universities are located. 
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minutes to get from Xiwang Cun to the Beijing city core with the metro. There is also a bus 
station close by with routes covering a large part of the city. However, with the increased 
traffic jams in Beijing the metro was often the preferred means of transportation for those 
commuting long distances, even if this meant going through the agony of squeezing and 
pushing in with literally thousands of other people during the rush hours. 
The landscape around Xiwang Cun is completely different than what you find in 
downtown Beijing.  It is flat and barren with large highways and the rail road tracks leading 
out from the capital to the surrounding areas going through?.  
In the vicinity of Xiwang Cun there is a newly constructed Japanese shopping mall, 
filled with shops featuring both Chinese and western brands as well as a food court. Most 
graduates used this place to just to hang out, since the mall was one of the few places for 
entertainment in the area. Most of the commodities were a little stiff for the wallets of the 
rural graduates but for the girls it was a popular place to go window-shopping. Next to the 
shopping mall was a huge construction site with posters covering the fences promoting with 
big, glossy pictures the new, high-class apartment complexes that were being built. On the 
opposite side lay the newly built Changping Life Science and Technology Park, which is a 
centre for newly established companies related to biological and technological research with 
focus on ‘innovation’, often reflected in the names of the companies. Many of the offices 
were still empty during my time there, but they were gradually filling up with new companies.  
To get to Xiwang Cun from the metro one had to pass the shopping mall and continue 
along a mud trail crossing a small field. A large fence was put up between the village and the 
shopping mall, with two opening where people could go in and out. There was also a river 
running through the village dividing it in two, but it was only visible when you approached 
from the outside. Once on the other side of the fence the river had been walled off, though the 
foul smell it gave off revealed its existence and a constant stench hung over part of the village 
until it dried out during the summer. 
 
Structural organization and daily life 
Xiwang Cun is very different from Beijing proper, mainly because of its lack of urban 
planning, with an organic and apparently chaotic structure. The whole city, which I never got 
to explore the full extent of, looked like a labyrinth and it was easy to get lost if you did not 
know the backstreets. There was trash lying around everywhere, and small garbage dumps 
were established close to the main intersections. During the period I was in Xiwang Cun there 
was constant construction, old one-story houses were torn down and new uniform looking 
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buildings were put up, but also already existing buildings were extended upwards. Most of the 
buildings had six to seven floors, some looking quite flimsy, while others had the appearance 
of being prisons from the outside. A completely smooth façade dressed with tiles and fenced 
windows bore words of the dangers that were perceived to be outside. In a way the housing 
structure was a form of ‘archisemiotics’ (Davis, 1992) where the landlords owning the houses 
were trying to protect themselves from the apparent chaos and uncivilized world outside, 
inscribed in the built environment. The small, dark alleyways were made of gravel, dirt and 
sand, with different small shops, bike repair services, markets, and so on. Everywhere notes 
were posted for jobs available or rooms for rent, and these jobs would typically be paid 
somewhere between 1300-2000 Yuan, that is the same or lower than what a typical migrant 
worker would receive in a month. You could not hear any cars as you walked through the 
backstreets, only the sound of people, dogs barking and children screaming. During the 
summer there would also be many swallows filling the air with their chirping. The common 
phenomena of ‘kissing buildings’, buildings standing close enough that people can kiss from 
opposite sides25, composed the majority of the building mass in Xiwang Cun.  Since most of 
these buildings did not stringently follow, or in worst cases completely ignored the fire 
regulations during the construction there was a worry about the potential fire hazards. 
Moreover the alleyways were too narrow for any fire trucks to drive through26. Despite 
intense construction work there never seemed to be enough rooms to satisfy the growing 
demand, and a room was seldom empty for a long period of time. The fast growing population 
also lead to problems with access to water and electricity. High pressure on the existing 
system resulted in power shortages and water was cut off several times during the spring and 
summer months. 
The tidal wave of people migrating to Xiwang Cun also changed the lifestyle of locals 
living there. One source stated that while in 2002 most people relied on farming and 
occasional odd jobs, the villagers today almost exclusively relied on so called ‘tiles-
economy’, an economy based on the construction and renting out of rooms and apartments as 
their main source of income. A calculation of a typical monthly income can be done through 
taking the building I lived in as an example. The building was the consolidation of two 
                                                 
25
 These buildings are often also called ‘hand shaking buildings’(wozhou), since people can shake hands from 
facing buildings. 
26
 While I was conducting fieldwork in Beijing another migrant enclave had a fire incident in the South of 
Beijing killing 18 and injuring another 24 people. The Town was shut down and 80.00 migrants were forced 
to move, leaving behind a mere 3000 locals with huge loans and empty factories. This also affected the 
regular Beijing inhabitants as these people were producing clothes for the big markets in Dahongmen near 
the Beijing Zoo.  See:  http://www.globaltimes.cn/beijing/society/2011-05/658346.html (Li, 2010). 
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buildings connected with staircases and long corridors of what seemed like endless rows of 
doors. The rooms varied in size and inhabitants. Some were small with space for one, while 
most had two people living in one room, and others had four to six people. I estimate there 
was around 200 people living in my building at the time I was there. The people living there 
were not registered in any place other than my landlord`s books, so officially they did not live 
there but were still back in their village or where they had their hukou registration. According 
to the landlord rooms ranged from 100 Yuan (for a dorm room bed) a month to 600 Yuan, 
excluding electricity, water and internet fees. With approximately 110 rooms and 500 Yuan in 
average per room they were earning 55.000 Yuan a month (my estimates). Despite spending 
money renovating the building and keeping it in good shape, they earned a lot of money 
compared to an average Chinese person. During my time in Xiwang Cun I observed investors 
from outside buy up plots of land and build new houses in order to rent them out, thereby 
squeezing out the local inhabitants, a process that could be described as a professionalization 
of the market.  
The inside of a typical building in Xiwang Cun was fenced up and had plenty of 
surveillance. In the building where I lived my landlord and his wife lived on the first floor 
where their living room functioned as their office, reception area and headquarters of the 
building. There were several TV-screens from their CCTV system showing people coming 
and leaving the building, as well as walking in the hall ways. The internet connection and 
modems were also in this area with a Gordian knot of wires stretching throughout the whole 
building. Few people I knew had exclusive use of a toilet, rather it was shared with the rest of 
the building, and facilities like proper heating systems, bathroom, kitchen and air-
conditioning were luxuries few people had. If one had kitchen facilities cooking was done 
using large gas cylinders which were provided by certain distributors. Even though gas has 
become more and more common as fuel, coal was still the preferred method of heating, 
barbecuing, heating water and so on. The coal dust hung like clouds over the village during 
the winter and in the morning it was normal to wake up with a thin layer of coal dust on one’s 
face. This observation from Xiwang Cun has also been described as characteristic of urban 
villages in Chongqing and Shenyang (Wang and Wang, 2009:146-147). 
There were many small, one-floor shops along the road which sold cheap food, sex 
toys, ‘massages’ and there were also tarpaulins spread on the ground with vegetables and 
fruits for sale which were all part of the informal economy in the village. These products and 
services were targeted at the relatively poor population. Food was much cheaper in Xiwang 
Cun that in the city, and a decent dinner could be bought for 5-10 Yuan, while in Beijing city-
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centre it was three to four times as expensive. With food prices increasing and wages static 
this provided another reason for living here, even if the restaurants’ standards of hygiene were 
lower due to a more lenient control regime. Since the cost of living was lower in this area the 
small surplus the rural graduates had could be invested on leisure activities such as going out 
with friends, courting or taking trips into town to go window shopping. This said, people were 
very conscious about how they spent their money. 
Now that we have examined the growth of urban villages in China and the structure 
and organization of in Xiwang Cun, I shall go on to examine the spatial dimension of the 
village and how it comes to be marked of as contested space. 
 
Luan and Anjing – the power of representation  
 
Space is fundamental in any form of communal life, space is fundamental in any exercise 
of power 
 Foucault (1989:252)  
 
As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter urban villages like Xiwang Cun are viewed as 
being outside the civilized city but at the same time a product of it, making it ‘out of place’ 
(Douglas, 1966). This begs a brief discussion on the spatial dimension of Xiwang Cun as it 
forms the frame for the rural graduates living there. Spatiality has largely been overlooked in 
anthropological studies earlier due to its conceived position as external and not taking into 
consideration the relationship space has to power in the larger political- economic context 
(Zhang, 2001a). Hence, we have to see beyond social space as simply ‘containers’ of social 
relations and activities27 and rather view urban space as ‘lived’ sites for contesting relations of 
rights and power (Lefebvre, 1991).  
A notion that is often used to describe the space in Xiwang Cun and other urban 
villages is luan meaning chaotic and is often associated with something dangerous. In 
opposition to the unmanaged space we have anjing- which is peaceful and harmonious- the 
civilized city. The luan spaces needs to be managed, because as we have learnt from the 
descriptions about on the structures of Xiwang Cun, it creates a problem of legitimacy. 
Moreover, it is an obstacle to Beijing’s beautification and civilizing projects (Zhang, 2001b). 
The inhabitants become a blur in the chaotic structures and thus create a problem for the 
government on how to manage the population living there and the non-legible space (Scott, 
1998). Furthermore, the perception of the urban villages as luan seen from the outside was a 
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 See for example Massey, (1994), Harvey (1989) Smart (2001), Soja (1989), Rofel (1999) 
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result of these villages in the peri-urban areas being perceived as hotbeds of crime and 
disorder, which threatened public security. During my fieldwork I was, as mentioned in the 
introduction, working for a Chinese IT-company not too far from Xiwang Cun. When I told 
people where I lived, I was several times asked whether it was safe for me to live there as a 
single girl. Many of the people I met in that company were also rural graduates, but had 
managed to get a job and therefore did much better financially than the rural graduates I met 
in Xiwang Cun. Many of them also told me that they considered moving to a cheaper place 
like Xiwang Cun, but the conclusion was always the same; Xiwang Cun and other urban 
villages were too luan and unorganized so that it could not possibly be safe to live there.  
My interlockers living in Xiwang Cun had a different view on the place. Yes, it was 
luan and dirty, but it was not dangerous in any way, they said. Still, on several occasions I 
noticed the strong stigma associated with migrant settlements such as Xiwang Cun. Once an 
interlocker of mine and I had talked to a young man that was working in an IT company in 
Haidian, later on the same evening, he had returned to the shop where he had met us and 
asked us urgently not to tell anyone that he lived in Xiwang Cun. It is important to add here 
that we had never met this man before that same day, and had no connections to his network. 
My interlocker also found this funny, since she could not understand what he was afraid of 
and thought that Xiwang Cun was a good place to live. In line with this, that same interlocker 
only a couple of weeks later clearly avoided to mention that she lived in Xiwang Cun when 
we met a friend of her’s in down-town Beijing.   
As urban villages are imagined and represented as places of disorder and crime, the 
spaces are also marked as unsafe and a threat towards ‘order’. This is also the case of the 
people living there, as we will see in the next chapter.  In the case of Tangjialing, which we 
started this chapter with, officials with the Beijing municipal government said that they hoped 
the renovation project could improve the integration between urban and rural areas, 
stimulating the low-end housing market and improve the living standards for rural workers 
(China Daily, June 2nd 2010). However, Yu Jianrong, sociologist at the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences, who was also interviewed in the same article argued that there were ‘fears 
that a large concentration of disillusioned, educated youths - the ant tribe (…)- could pose a 
potential risk to social stability. As we learn from history, grassroot intellectuals are the most 
likely to cause social turbulence’ (China Daily, June 2nd 2010). Tangjialing was thereby torn 
down, because it represented a contested space and threatened the image of the party-state as 
capable of managing its space and population. Thereby, demolition became a remedy to 
disorder, as Zhang (2001b) argues. I should also state that there are many urban villages left 
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alone in the peri-urban areas of Beijing, but they have not received the same kind of media 
attention from national and international media. Thus, nothing has been done in these cases to 
draw the attention to the ‘failure’ of the state to govern these areas and they are left alone.  
Moreover, this also reflects a tacit approval of these places, similar to the ones Smart (2001) 
describe in Hong Kong, since the government neither desires nor is able to do anything about 
the villages. It would consume too many resources and create new demands for the party-state 
to provide affordable housing options for the millions of migrants arriving in Beijing every 
year.  
To sum up this section I would like to draw some parallels to an ethnographic account 
written by Zhang (2001b) which describes Zhejiang Cun, also an urban village but at the 
centre of Beijing. After a big and diverse migrant community from mainly Zhejiang had built 
up the area over almost a decade it was demolished. Zhang argue that even if the official 
campaigns stated that the demolishing had been done in the name of fighting illegal housing, 
the ultimate goal had been ‘to remove the spatial ground for the growth of an alternative 
social power outside state control’ (2001b:220). Through this chapter we have seen that there 
were strong indications that this was the same in the case of Tangjialing. A ‘slum of 
intellectuals’ in a luan and unmanaged space represented a potential threat towards a stable 
and ‘harmonious’ society. However, now it is Xiwang Cun that is marked of as a threat 
towards the civilized society. 
 
Concluding remarks 
In the beginning of this chapter we were introduced to the story of Tangjialing, a former urban 
village for rural graduates on the outskirts in Beijing and its rise and fall. Tangjialing was one 
of many urban villages located in the peri-urban areas of the cities in China. They are 
characterised by high building density, poor sanitary condition, open sewage and are 
constituting ‘enclaves of informality in an otherwise highly regulated society’ (Qi et al. 
2007:23). Due to this it is cheap to live in these urban villages and the reason why many rural 
graduates choose to live in Xiwang Cun. Places like Xiwang Cun are in most cases allowed to 
continue to exist in an tacit approval from the state (Smart, 2001), as the government is not 
able to provide enough affordable housing option for the rural graduates and other migrants 
arriving in Beijing every year. Xiwang Cun stood up like a phoenix from the ashes of 
Tangjialing and became the new home for thousands of young rural graduates hoping to fulfil 
their dreams in the big city. Through the descriptions of Xiwang Cun we learnt that the 
everyday lives of the rural graduates are shaped by informal arrangements and structures. 
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Viewing urban space as a ‘lived’ sites for contesting relations of rights and power in 
places like Xiwang Cun is useful to understand how they are marked and represented as 
spaces of disorder and luan –chaos, and therefore a potential threat towards order and 
civilization. This makes Xiwang Cun, not only a place, but also a space in need of 
improvement. I will now turn to the discourses on wenming- civilization- and suzhi- human 
quality- to understand what is shaping the modern subject in China. 
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2 A quest for human quality  
While the situation of underemployed rural graduates in urban areas is by no means special to 
China, there is a particularity to the specific cultural and political associations attached to 
rural graduate students. In this chapter I analyse how the Chinese party-state is managing and 
shaping its subjects, more particular how the ambiguities the underemployed rural graduates 
are facing today are understood and handled, from the party-state`s point of view. In the first 
half of this chapter I outline and discuss China`s recent history in the light of wenming and 
suzhi in a pursuit to answer these questions. As briefly mentioned in the introduction, this 
process has been understood through a historical discourse of suzhi- quality- in the 
population, in need of improvement (Anagnost 1997). The thought that ‘the people’, or ‘the 
masses’, as containers for the nation’s character and quality is further grounded in the 
modernity discourse of wenming- civilization- in China. Outside its historical context the 
suzhi and wenming discourse is difficult to grasp the overarching importance these have had 
not only to accommodate the party-states policies, but as a part of a discourse that is 
experienced, negotiated and shaped by different social actors (Jacka, 2006), in this case the  
and the rural graduates everyday life. Therefore I examine how these discourses have been 
molded and re-molded several times during the last decades, which help us to understand the 
cultural meanings of the relationship between the rural: urban, how this is connected to human 
quality, and in last instance to national development.  
The second half of this chapter analyses how the rural graduates have come to be 
conceptualized in people`s mind through media as an ‘ant tribe’. I continue by looking at 
three techniques of representation that have been used in the media and how they can shed 
light on why the rural graduates have gotten so much attention. After that I turn to the specific 
arguments used by state official in the media and the problem with productive bodies not 
being located at the right place, thereby creating a problem with managing the subject.  
 
Wenming, wenhua and suzhi with Confucian roots 
According to Anagnost(1997) wenhua- culture- is highly contested as it embodies the national 
culture and has been constituted and reconstituted by the ways and means through which the 
Chinese people has cultivated and embodied Confucian ideals since the early 19th century, 
linking it to education and familiarity of the classics in Chinese literature. One would acquire 
this state of wenhua-education or culture - through sticking to core Confucian values, and 
thereby move toward wenming- civilization and modernity. This meant on an individual plan 
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to continue the process self-cultivating through lifelong learning (Yip, 2002). On a collective 
plan it meant submission to the hierarchy where no figure or institutions were valued higher 
than the nation, and later the party- state. This created a logic of China`s population holding 
back to reach modernity and it was therefore important to raise the populations quality, 
especially of the young generation who were directly responsible for the future of the nation 
(Kipnis, 2011:10, Anagnost, 1997, Yip, 2002). With this as the backdrop Anagnost(1997) 
argue that the wenming discourse is a discourse of lack, ‘referring to the failure of the Chinese 
people to embody international standards of modernity, civility and discipline’(Anagnost, 
1997:76). All this translates to a construction of the Chinese people as being of ‘low quality’- 
suzhi cha’, which adds strong social Darwinist associations to the suzhi notion, as there is a 
thought of development attached to it (Kipnis, 2006). Jacka (2009) does also describe this 
anxiety about modernity and Chinas constant fear of being weak and backward because of its 
peoples deficiency28. Together with the visionary image of a civilized and modern nation 
which was cultivated and conducted, grave concerns were given to the individual suzhi and 
wenhua.  
 
Break and continuity- Wenhua suzhi under Mao  
In 1949 the People`s Republic of China was founded which resulted in a dramatically 
ideological turn as revolutionary propaganda promoted that the quality of the people could be 
found within the rural masses. As we already learnt in the introduction educational practices 
and objectives were still important, but only in promoting national development towards a 
socialist civilization. Moreover, during the Cultural Revolution (1965-1976) Mao ‘called for 
an end to any remnants of an 'old' civilization that obstructed China's path towards an 
enlightened Communist society. In order to cast off all remnants of an ‘old’ society, 
Confucius teachings were expressly targeted, for they epitomized as traditional Chinese 
culture and thought. As a result, Confucius teachings of traditional classics and rituals were 
openly denigrated. Education and wenhua- culture - was made the arena of struggle, while 
wenming was according to Anagnost used in a more socialist Darwinist approach where 
history of the country was downplayed and had to be changed in order to become the 
nationalistic ideal with a clear class approach (Kipnis 2001). The communist state re-molded 
the cultural thoughts of Confucius and the thoughts of wenhua and suzhi persisted.  
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 Both Anagnost(1997) and Jacka(2009) subscribe this anxiety to the colonial past of China  which reach its 
high point at the turn of the 19th century when they lost the Opium Wars against the British Empire. This is still 
today a controversial topic. 
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By sending intellectuals and other urbanities to the West of China and the countryside 
to raise their quality, people were subjected to education (intellectual) and ideological 
indoctrination (moral) and this together with labor (physical) was aimed at strengthening the 
nation. Yip (2002) points out that the lesson from the ‘Cultural Revolution’ was that the belief 
and the internationalization of the suzhi discourse was not enough to maintain the strength of 
the regime, one also had to have the ability to speak to the political apparatus (Yip, 2002:13). 
 
Reform and revival of the suzhi discourse  
With the opening up reform and open door policy introduced by Deng Xiao Ping China had to 
change its perspective on how to view development. In the post-Mao era one moved gradually 
from a class discourse, with the previously mentioned reforms of the danwei systems in the 
1990s and the new organizing concept for the national imaginary was again focused on 
wenming; a picture that could, and still can, compromise both the past and the future. 
According to Anagnost(1997) this was important in order to maintain both a critical reflection 
on the national past with Mao and the ‘Cultural Revolution’, at the same time as it opened up 
for imagining the future China.   
As in the Confucian and imperial times the reform period saw a process where the idea 
of improving the population again was a national strategy for social transformation 
(Anagnost, 1997). There were no other way to explain Chinas relation to the larger global 
community than the lack of wenhua and that had led China in the backwater both politically 
and economically (Jacka, 2009). Thorough the education system and the policy of ‘education 
for quality’- suzhi jiaoyu – the rural subjects were to be led out of backwardness(Kipnis, 
2011). The result was a generation taught to focus on self-development and self-realization 
through education in order to reach their goals and thereby earn a high skilled, high salary job 
(Hoffman 2010). The implications of this was then, according to Ananost (1997) a 
‘constructions of civility in the post-Mao society had come to signify the readiness of rural 
communities to become integrates into global flows of capital and labour’ (Anagnost, 
1997:76). It was not only setting the site for production within the national borders but also in 
relation to a global site. In this the party also had to evolve in order to fit into the changing 
world picture.  
  
Suzhi facilitated by the party-state 
In the post-Mao period, wenming is closely associated with the idea of modernization. But it 
is used officially to convey an idea of modernity that distinctly differs from that of the liberal 
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capitalist democracies in the West. The goal is to establish a ‘socialist spiritual civilization’ 
that offers not just an ‘alternative modernity’ but also one that will supersede the dubious 
claims of the Western liberal democracies to be ‘the end of history’ (Anagnost, 1997: 85). At 
the heart of the revival of the suzhi discourse we find the Chinese Communist Party, founded 
in 1921 on the principles of Marxism, Socialism and egalitarian values. Together with the 
reforms in the 1980s one saw the proportional rise of the focus on suzhi again in party 
rhetoric’s and policies.  
With the Chinese authority`s problematisation of human conduct as an indication of 
the population of having ‘low quality’, the one-child policy was deemed necessary to ensure a 
generation of high-quality people (Hairong, 2003, Greenhalgh and Winckler, 2005, Woronov, 
2009). However, as Bakken (2000) notes, the process does not stop at the birth of ‘fewer and 
better quality children’, it is also a case of cultivating and fostering high-quality human beings 
(Liu 2008:197). Making suzhi increasingly connected to maximization of the capabilities and 
value of the human body (Liu, 2008a:197, Anagnost, 1997, Fong, 2004). Despite the various 
meanings of the word, depending on the setting, having high-suzhi is still connected to 
academic-attributes (Bakken, 2000, Fong, 2004), and Liu (2009) notes that ‘in present-day 
china, education, suzhi, qualifications, social mobility, and ‘the good life’ have become inter-
relational concepts’ (Liu, 2009:197). 
As mention in the last section the remodeling of the Chinese people from being 
uncivilized to entering the global market was now the new goal. To constitute a modern 
nation the ‘people’, meaning the masses in the countryside, had to be subject to a pedagogical 
process. The party sees itself as filling in ‘what is missing’ to cover over the aprotic divides 
between China’s problematic past and its imagined future, but at the same time its rhetoric 
covers over the articulation between a socialist imaginary and its uncanny compatibility with 
global capitalism’ (Anagnost, 1997:79-80). Not only do the party-state legitimacy to rule rest 
on resolving, or at least managing these contradictions (Kristoffersen, 2005),  but the CCP are 
also the ones facilitating the suzhi discourse and that supply the Chinese population with 
arenas to raise their suzhi.  Hence, suzhi becomes central to the survival and legitimacy of the 
party-state in the post-Mao era (Yip, 2002:35). 
Furthermore, the opening up of the market led to a new focus on the individual as a 
consuming subject that could improve the nation through its consumption29, and also resulted 
in reforms within the political, cultural, social and economic sphere. The establishment of 
                                                 
29
 This is something that we will get back to in chapter four. 
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special economic zones in 2nd and 3rd tier cities along the coast of China, enabled a head start 
for many Chinese coastal cities. This created a growth in the inequality between coast and 
inland areas, and a dependency on low-skilled, low demanding labor force from mostly the 
rural areas. Besides, a growing mass of rural subject started migrating to the civilized urban 
areas. Thereby the wenhua suzhi discourse that was revived in the 90’s was now directed 
towards the newly mobile rural masses. The fear and anxiety of the country`s massive rural 
population demanded improvement, and the ‘other’ that the nation reflected itself against in 
understanding progress and modernity (Hairong, 2003) But where does this leave the rural 
graduates migrating to the cities? Are they not already ‘civilized’? I argue that this is the focal 
point of the ambiguity created by the rural migrant’s situation, and which also creates a 
difficult situation for the party-state. Everyone acknowledge the tough situation the rural 
graduates are in, but at the same time the Beijing central government do not want them or 
other labour migrants living on their doorstep in urban villages. I now go on to analyze media 
and its role in making the situation of the rural graduates known. Here we will see how the 
discourses of wenming and suzhi are interrelated and influence the production and shaping of 
a modern subject in China and thereby also the rural graduates. 
 
‘The ant tribe’, what is in a name? 
At the end of 2009 and the beginning of 2010 the label ‘the ant tribe’ went viral in national 
and international media30. It was created by Lian (2009) in his book with the same name to 
describe the rural graduates, their lives and their living conditions. Like the term ‘floating 
population’ used for the many millions of migrants in China, the notion of an ‘ant tribe’ is a 
socially constructed category infused with social and political meanings that was invented in a 
particular moment in Chinas history. In this section I will try to make sense of the term ‘ant 
tribe’, why it became such an important label and the implications it has for subject making in 
China. Further, I will look at how the government reacted to this new ‘group’ and how they 
rationalized the current situation. It is important to remember that naming and categorization 
should be understood as inseparable from social power. ‘The labour of categorization, of 
making things explicit and classifying them’ (Bourdieu 1991:236, in Zhang 2001b:24), are 
crucial mechanisms for defining the meaning and order of the social world. I now go on to 
                                                 
30
 I will here only focus on national media in China due to the scope of the thesis, This is not the same as saying 
that international media did not have a major role in the creation of this phenomenon and the way the notion 
develop. The interaction between national and international clearly did trigger each other, but also argued for 
different things. Despite the media reform in the 1970’s the state have found new tools to keep media as a 
mouthpiece the party-stat (Esarey, 2006). 
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describe three techniques of representation commonly used to construct images of the ‘ant 
tribe’ in Chinese media.   
 
Unifying and homogenizing 
Through media the rural graduates have been portrayed and referred to as ‘the ant tribe’ since 
the phenomenon hit the news. Though, people I met during my fieldwork did not ascribe 
themselves as sharing any fundamental common traits or identity with other ‘ants’ based on 
their ‘common’ educational background or that they earned less than 2000 Yuan a month, 
which have been set at variables defining the ‘ants’. Rather the other ‘ants’ were like any 
other stranger that could represent a potential competition in the labour market. As we will 
see in chapter five people did instead creating new relations based on common geographical 
background or on a mutual dependency relation.   
It is important to remember that change and development is not a uniform process and 
people act and is influenced in different manners. Instead of realizing the diversity of the 
group, if you can even call it a group, the rural graduates are portrayed through the media as a 
large, homogenous mass of people that are lured to the cities only to get their dreams broken. 
Failing to realize and portray the rural graduates as a group with diverse experiences and 
lifestyles, and acknowledge the diversity in work, education background, place of origin, etc. 
they are being classified through censuses and surveys to generate ‘scientific’ knowledge 
about this potential unknown. This results in a conceptualization of the rural graduates as a 
real social entity. For example; ‘About 50 percent of ant tribe members refuse to identify 
themselves as disadvantaged’ (People`s Daily Online, December 10th 2010). 
Moreover through applying the word ‘tribe’- zu31- one is applying a kind of unified 
group or clan belonging, making up a unified entity. Hence, it is creating a group that stands 
both in opposition to the urban, modern subject, while at the same time they are people with 
high suzhi. This creates a situation which is full of ambiguities. In the next section I argue that 
the rural graduates are also portrayed as poor, struggling and even naive individuals that had 
their dreams broken, which again it also appealing for a larger public to read about, hence it is 
good for the sales numbers of the newspapers as ‘China's ‘ant tribe’ searches for better future’ 
(People`s Daily, January 16th 2010). 
 
Poor, struggling ‘ants’ 
                                                 
31
族:zú: clan, nationalitity or group. Is also used for minorities. 
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Like his fellow ‘ants’, the only qualities Chen hopes for in his new home is that it 
is cheap and safe. He cannot afford to worry about living standards 23 year-old 
cable factory worker Chen after moving from Tangjialing 
 
               23 year old Chen in Tangjialing 
(China Daily, June 2nd 2010). 
 
There are countless stories of struggling ‘ants’ in the media. The story is almost always along 
the lines of:  graduate from rural province have migrated to Beijing to find a job and more 
opportunities. Then he or she realized that life in the city was much tougher than expected, 
but that he or she is determined to keep on struggling. Leaving Beijing would be considered a 
loss of face for some a disappointment for their families.  
 
 One who can endure the toughest hardships can become the most successful 
person.’ (..)Yes, the metropolis is a tough place because you're competing with 
top talents. I just have to give myself some more time. I don't want to go home 
empty handed. I would lose face. 
                   
                                                                          24 year old Xiao Cun in Tangjialing 
           (China Daily, June 2nd 2010) 
     
This struggle is something most Chinese people can identify with and thereby also creates an 
enormous attention nationwide, but at the same time it shapes the everyday actions of people. 
I remember sitting in the metro one day during my fieldwork. By that time I was already used 
to the sight of old women, women with children or blind couples dressed in Mao-dress rags 
begging for money. Most of the times they were either ignored or shuffled away and only 
sporadically given any money. This day, however, it was different.  On one of the metro stops 
a young man in his 20ies, dressed in decent clothes entered with his guitar on the chest and 
started to singing about the hardship in the city. At once almost all the people that I observed 
from the place I sat gave money to him, when he came around collecting money. It was, as I 
saw it, something that stroke a nerve among the people sitting there. Everybody knew the 
hardship of being a parent or a grandparent in cultivating a child that would be the security for 
the family in the future, everyone knew what kind of expectations and pressure that laid on 
this young man`s shoulders.  
This means that on one side the media are portraying a large, unified mass labeled ‘the 
ant tribe’, while also highlighting poor and struggling ‘ants’ with broken dreams, that can 
potentially represent a problem. This was also highlighted by Lian (2009) who stated that 
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Regarding the state of equality in China in the next five to 10 years, 60 percent of 
them hold a gloomy attitude. Through analysis, Lian and his team discovered that 
ant tribe members' sense of social fairness is closely correlated with their families' 
economic status and their personal monthly incomes.  
 
  (People`s Daily Online, January 21st 2011) 
 
This was then taken by many as that the rural graduates held a potentially political problem. 
Moreover, the continuous use of the metaphor ‘ant tribe’ have, I argue, lead to a further 
abnormalising of the picture of the rural graduates when held up against the civilized, modern 
and urban permanent residents.  
 
Abnormalising 
 
Lian vividly describes this group of unemployed youth as ‘ants’. ‘Ants are the 
smartest kind of insects; despite their size, they are diligent, hardworking, and if 
left ignored, can bring about serious problems,‘ explains Lian. ‘Also they live in 
their own ‘colonies ’as ants do,’ he added. 
 
  (Global Times, November 2nd 2009) 
 
Above is a quote from Lian and how he came to think of the nature metaphor of an ‘ant tribe’ 
to describe the rural graduates. As mentioned in the beginning, I argue this description of the 
students as something out of nature and ‘out of place’ (Douglas, 1966), which transfers them 
into objects in need of civilization. Instead of being of high quality the subject is made into a 
big mass which is not managed, and have to be cultivated in order to fit in with the urban and 
modern. Headlines like 'Ant tribe' crawling to new digs after demolitions’(China Daily,June 
2nd 2010) are also contributing to re-establishing the ‘otherness’ of people migrating to the 
city, and in particular the rural graduate students. What kind of civilized urban subject would 
‘crawl’ to anything? 
 To sum  up, through creating a media portray of a homogenous, unified mass 
‘crawling’ into the city, there is a process of creating an abnormal, natural and uncivilized 
opposite to the urban, civilized, modern subject living in Beijing. Furthermore, the 
disciplining aspect comes into view, as there are individuals that should be civilized through 
their educational background. Instead they have turned into another challenge in the wake of 
the reform the 90s. In a way it can seem like the newspapers argument for a homogenous ‘ant 
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tribe’ to be a result of Mao nostalgia and a critique toward how China on the social level have 
failed to help its young and promising.  This said, how are the party officials responding to 
this in the media? What is their position? How are they trying to manage the productive 
bodies to participate in the march towards wenming? 
 
The management of productive bodies  
The disciplining aspect comes to show most clearly when the party seizes on the surplus 
values subjects as a measure in its civilizing project. The discussion below therefore examines 
in more detail how the party-state deploys its civilizing practices to awaken the Chinese 
graduates to a consciousness of their own productive powers. Hence, for the state, it becomes 
important to manage these productive bodies. The potential when it comes to labour and the 
discipline of its quality are present in many images of the consuming bodies, but here we will 
focus on the images of the producing bodies as embedded ‘in state sponsored constitutions of 
modernity as ‘civility’ itself’ (Anagnost, 1997:87). 
While we saw in the end of last chapter the ‘slum of intellectuals’ could pose a threat 
for the party-state, however, that kind of statements are not heard from what Chinese party-
officials say in the media. Rather one finds a strong support from the party-state for the rural 
graduates supporting them in their quest to make it in the city and a repeated promise to 
decrease the gap between rural and urban areas in developing 2nd and 3rd tier cities in China, 
improving the infrastructure in the city, offer more housing options and so on (China Daily, 
July 27th 2011). Hence, the party-officials realize this is part of larger structural problem, but 
are arguing for an ‘excessive population’, like we will also see in chapter three, which makes 
transition and reforms hard to implement at the speed it is needed. It is important to keep in 
mind that this situation breaks all the promises people feel that they have gotten through their 
education through the years. Still, through the media the party-state is also partly blaming the 
rural graduates for the situation they are in. These thoughts can be summed up in three main 
arguments.  
First of all the students are highly encouraged to  move to 2nd or 3rd tier cities, instead 
of big cities like Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chengdu and so on, where their capacity is  
more needed. Second, the quality of their education is not good enough or they do not have 
the right qualifications to get the jobs they want. Thereby they must grab the possibilities they 
can to improve their qualities. Lastly, the rural graduates have too high expectations to what 
they can achieve with their education. I will not judge whether or not these are the correct 
measurements, rather I will try to analyse the arguments from the perspective of how to create 
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a good quality human and how to manage them to contribute to reach the stage of wenming in 
China. 
 The first argument can be analysed as an attempt from party-state to move the ‘surplus 
labour’ and ‘productive bodies’ from the cities where the pressure on the labour market is the 
greatest, to the rural provinces where there is a deficit of recourses to push development. 
Hence, the rural graduates have a high quality through their education and are recognized for 
that, but in their present situation they become unmanageable subjects seen from the party-
states point of view. Of course this is not something that is unique for China, as we can see in 
many countries struggling with the same urbanization problem in distributing the education 
resources geographically, but it is interesting see the twist it takes in China. Some of the 
actual reforms, that I will only briefly mention here, are for example trying to send the 
students to the West of China and out in the countryside, tempting them with fast promotions 
and many benefits. An example is the article about ‘graduates- turned- grass root officials in 
the counties’ in China Daily. Here it says that by ‘the end of 2011, the number of college 
graduates serving as grassroots village officials in China's rural areas topped 210,000’. 
However, the article ends with; ‘the report also noted that some graduates turned young 
officials lacked a sound understanding of local conditions and an awareness of public 
sentiments’ (China Daily, May 20th 2012). This might help us to understand how strong the 
‘hierarchy of desire’ with regards to preferred cities is in China, and also the connotation 
people have to the rural versus the urban. I also have to add that this regulation echoes the 
policies from the 1960s and 1970s under the previous mention ‘Cultural Revolution’. During 
that time, to bring cultural and political development to the frontier areas in the West of China 
graduates, skilled urban workers and professionals where relocated to the provinces and 
intellectuals and urban youth were sent to the countryside to be ‘educated’ (Zhang, 2001b:26) 
 The second and third argument are somewhat related. On one side the rural graduates 
are faced with more and more companies saying that their education is not of good enough 
quality, while at the same time arguing that they have too high expectation for what jobs they 
can get. There has been a growing discussion regarding the educational system in China both 
national and international with its apparent lack of innovative forces and ‘talent’ shortage. 
Moreover, as I have already been arguing for earlier there is a need to improve the individual 
and it is the lack of the individual that is hindering the rural students to find a job. 
Furthermore, the rural graduates have too high expectations, and according to Kipnis 
(2011) this is a growing problem that the party-state did not see coming with the educational 
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reforms and the suzhi jiaoyu (Fong, 2004). Instead, a Chinese social scientist quoted by 
People`s Daily Online notes that  
 
graduates should ignore lower salaries and accept that their long-term 
competitiveness is dependent on the training and experience they get and how fast 
they can learn and adapt.    
          (People`s Daily Online, December 8th 2011) 
 
Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that even if these official discourses that I have 
described and analyzed here are playing an important role in shaping the life of the rural 
graduates and the fact that the picture of them as an ‘ant tribe’ has been constructed, we must 
take into consideration the more mundane form of power and regulative forces that are 
influencing the everyday lives of the rural graduates in shaping this subject formation.   
  
Concluding remarks 
The thought of ‘the rural masses’ as containers for Chinas national character and suzhi is still 
an important in the linear development story towards modernity and wenming – civilization. 
Since this process has been understood through the historical discourses of suzhi- quality- and 
a lack of it in the larger population- the discourse has been an important part of the 
legitimizing the Chinese party-state politics in managing and shaping its population. It is 
difficult to grasp the overarching impact the suzhi and wenming discourse without taking into 
consideration its historical context. As these discourses have been molded and re-molded 
several times during the last decades to fit the political agenda of the CCP, it has also shaped 
and changed the cultural meaning of the rural: urban dualism, how this is linked to human 
quality and in last instance to the national progress of China. Education has been seen as the 
main tool to improve and overcome this lack of quality,   
Media give us a fruitful approach in understanding how the party-state negotiate the 
ambiguities that the rural graduates represent to the suzhi and wenming discourse. Despite 
being of high-quality through taking higher education, they end up in uncivilized and low-
quality areas. On one side they are breaking the ‘edcuational sucesss story’, which equals 
higher education and success. While on the other side they are recognized as an important part 
of the wenming process in China they become a problem as they stay on in the city, ignoring 
the party-states recommendation to move to 2nd and 3rd tier cities. This makes them 
unmanageable, productive bodies that need to be regulated. 
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 However, turning these graduates into ‘poor and misplaced subjects’ is not a process 
that the state can control completely. As social agents with their own intention, desires and 
ideological histories, Chinese rural graduates do not simply take up or internalize the subject 
position offered to them by the state, but create their own ways being in and part of the world. 
As I will argue in the next chapters the rural graduates have internalized the government 
ideals of improvement, even though they never talked about suzhi, but constantly saying that 
coming to the city was a way of improving oneself. This will be the thematic structures for the 
next chapters as choices and actions of the rural graduates can be linked to new tools of 
governance used by the Chinese government in the post-Mao era.  
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3 ‘I want to improve myself’ 
‘Why did you come to Beijing?’ I ask in Chinese. ‘I want to start wine shop’, 
Meili replies in broken English. She is sitting in a small, cramped room, no more 
than six square meters, looking out on one of the half-paved dirt roads in Xiwang 
Cun while pushing the buttons on her Nokia cell phone. The room is a date cake 
shop she and two of her friends opened a week earlier. ‘I want to implove myself’ 
(sic.), she adds with a big smile as she pulls her winter coat tighter around herself 
while looking out the window. 
 
For Meili, migrating to the city was not purely about economic achievements, but also a 
chance to ‘improve oneself’. The city represented an urban quality that could not be obtained 
in the rural areas where she and my other interlockers were from. The suzhi and wenming 
discourses have, as argued in previous chapter, been constructed through a historical 
precedence of the city as a place where ‘high quality individuals’ are cultivated, while the 
countryside have been understood as the opposite with its ‘low quality mass’ holding China 
back from progress towards modernization. This chapter demonstrate the form these 
discourses take in the everyday life of young rural graduates in Beijing, and how they are 
actively shaping the state notions in their view. Not only are the rural graduates trying to 
capture this urban quality by physically being in what is perceived to be urban areas (as seen 
in chapter one), they are also trying to show an improved, successful self which fits with a 
modern life in the city.  
In order to understand the change taking place from rural to urban, I continue to carve 
out the implications of the shift from quantity to quality citizens as outlined in chapter two. 
This opens up for analysis how the diverse arenas they function in expose various outlooks 
and strategies in coping with their life in the world. We are also made aware of how new 
perspectives are made relevant among the graduates and can be used to understand their 
choices and actions. The argument of an ‘excessive, rural population’ holding China back is 
still present and internalized in people`s self-conception, motivating the drive for ‘improving 
oneself’. ‘Improving oneself’ referred among my interlockers to a process of social mobility 
through both conscious and unconscious efforts at self-improvement. We can observe this in 
instances of interaction by investigating how various signs are used to express such types of 
variation among the students. I therefore analyse the encounters where specific processes of 
social identification occur, as ‘identity is produced and reproduced in the course of social 
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interaction’(Jenkins, 2008a:5). Moreover, I investigate how the individual’s effort to improve 
itself is a moral act responding to the socioeconomic division they experience, as well the 
suzhi discourse expressed by the state. 
Some arenas stood out as especially important fields for the improvement process; 
being a successful businesswoman or businessman, consuming things considered to be of the 
urban sphere, and continuing to focus on education. It is important to note here that these 
fields are first and foremost analytical fields as they in everyday situations meet and interact. 
Through Goffman’s analytical framework on ‘impression management’(1959), I investigate 
the ways people negotiate their social identity in how they deal with others and the urban 
sphere as a whole. These at times conflicting roles are played out according to the situation 
they are expected to perform, but also creating dilemmas and non-realistic role distinctions. 
An important point made by Goffman (1959) and Barth (1969) is that ‘the individual is 
consciously pursuing goals and interests. They seek to ‘be’- ‘something’ or ‘somebody’, in 
order to successfully assume particular identities (Jenkins, 2008b:20) according to the 
situations they are faced with. However, one should avoid the trap of ascribing too much 
agency to the actors in choosing their identity and potentially leaving out the power aspect of 
this process like Barth (1969) have been criticised for doing. This is not to say that Barth’s 
processual view on the creation of identity, and especially ethnic identity, is invalid, but it is 
important to take these criticisms into account; I still find his analytical tools valuable here. It 
is important to understand the stigma tied to the rural identity of the rural graduates, which 
they have to deal with before participating fully in the urban scene.  
 
‘Excessive population’ and otherness: motivational drives  
 
It was a sunny day in Xiwang Cun. Due to the recent sand storms that had been 
haunting Beijing the last couple of weeks, people still wrapped scarfs around their 
face when walking down one of the half-pawed dust roads. Now during rush hour 
waves of people returned from work, kindergarten children were being picked up 
by their grandparents and cars drove through the narrow street, giving the Chinese 
proverb ‘renshan, renhai’32- a mountain of people and an ocean of people- its true 
meaning. ‘What consequences are all these people going to have’, Huang 
complained as we sat inside his date cake shop looking out. ‘They are spending 
their money on all kinds of items, and with the high energy consumption, who 
knows what is going to happen?’ He continued by describing how he could not 
                                                 
32
 Chinese four-character idiom. Directly translated it becomes ‘people mountain, people seas’ , said in another 
way  ‘lots of people’. 
 56 
 
compete against so many people both with regards to his own business and 
background as a country boy from Zhejiang33. ‘Because of all the people here 
there is not enough space for everyone. That is why places like Xiwang Cun have 
come into being, because there are so many people living in China and they 
cannot afford to live other places. Yes, it is cheap here [Xiwang Cun], but also 
luan[chaotic]’. I asked him about Tangjialing and whether he thought the same 
could happen to Xiwang Cun, he replied: ‘Well, to tear down Tangjialing did not 
solve the problem and all the people just came here instead, so now there are even 
more people here, what can we do?’ He shook his head and mumbled on about 
what could happen to China if the development continued in the same pace as 
now. 
 
The notion of a rural, ‘excessive population34’ - renkou guoduo- in China has laid foundation 
for the discourse of suzhi. Due to the low quality of the larger, rural population, this has 
resulted in China`s failure to progress throughout history. As we can see from the empirical 
account above, this continues to be important in today`s post-Mao China in people`s 
understanding of themselves in relation to the surrounding world. The notion of the 
population as something that is in need of management has been actively constructed in China 
where the shift in focus towards quality of its population can be most clearly seen in the one-
child policy (Anagnost, 1997). The target for improvement of the population has been the 
marginalized groups, like migrants, who have been defined as ‘the other’ in this discourse. 
This social stigma towards migrants, including the rural graduates as we saw in the last 
chapter, have ‘resulted in physical and social segregation of rural migrants from urban 
residents’, which strengthen the stigmatizing stereotypes of the rural subjects (Chen, 2001:27, 
Chen et al., 2011).  
According to Barth (1969) and Jenkins (2008b), the way people construct their 
identity is through a complex and dynamic process consisting of self-ascription and others’ 
accepting or declining that image of the self. Subscribed identity from others, external 
categorization, can in varying degree be internalised and form the basis for the self-ascribed 
identity, through for example, stigmatized identity. I argue that we have to look at the process 
where external categorization comes to be internalized. In this case it`s the individuals who 
think that they have to improve themselves in order to fulfil their duties towards themselves, 
and the state, to be able to compete against the ‘excessive population’. This, as we saw in 
                                                 
33
 Zhejiang is a province in the south of China, bordering Shanghai. 
34
 I do not try to assert whether China is actually overpopulated, but rather that this has become actively 
constructed  by the Chinese government and also taken into people`s conscious when reflecting on their 
situation and the choices and actions they meet in their everyday life.  
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chapter two, has been tied to the quality discourse which brings us to a labelling perspective 
where ‘the interaction between self-definition and definition by others as a process of 
internalization’(Jenkins, 2008b:20-21). 
The model of internalisation ‘may occur if an individual is authoritatively labelled 
within an appropriate institutional setting. This model for internalization is not, however, 
sufficient. The capacity of authoritatively applied identification to constitute or influence 
individual experience affects whether or not individuals internalise the label(s)’(Jenkins, 
2008b:20-21). This is what we can see in China, where labels of uncivilized rural subjects 
stick to the rural graduates even if they have gotten a degree. Where they are from still labels 
them as unfit for urban life since they are not fulfilling the criteria to be civilized urban 
subjects; this creates a continuous worry among the migrants and also triggers their need to 
improve themselves.  
Finding a way out of the labelling and categorization is a constant process. While rural 
graduates and many semi-educated migrants are caught up in this ambiguous situation, they 
are also faced with the question of why they can’t get jobs when they possess the same 
qualities that others have, resulting in the process of improvement. As Jenkins argue ‘labelling 
may also, evoke resistance’(2008b:21). I contend that the actions taken by these youth can be 
viewed as resistance against the quality regime and at the same time argue that this is the 
reason they make a decision, consciously or not, to solve this apparent ambiguity by blaming 
themselves for not living up to the standards set by everyone else. The government claims an 
‘excessive population’, while doing as much as they can in order to improve people’s life 
situations. In reality, the only thing the rural graduates can do is to improve themselves, 
because the state can only do so much. Ultimately, they are responsible for their own success 
and, in the big picture, the development of China. 
  Halskov Hansen and Peng (2010) have also observed this phenomenon among rural 
youths in Shaanxi and Fujian Province, registering a ‘remarkable sense of personal 
responsibility expressed by the young people in relation to their own future and development 
(Halskov Hansen and Pang, 2010:39). I recorded similar patterns during my research in 
Beijing, where most of the youths placed enormous emphasis on their choices as being theirs 
and no one else’s, making the quality discourse an aspect of moral self-improvement as well. 
When I asked my informants what their parents thought of them going to the city they replied; 
‘this is my choice, not my parents!’ Some even got angry as they interpreted my question to 
be insulting toward their status as adults; ’I am not a kid anymore, I can make my own 
choices and decisions!’, a young man replied, annoyed. This was something I often 
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encountered when talking to young people (18-20 years old), as they may have had a greater 
need to justify their choice due to critical, overbearing parents, to show that they could make 
it on their own. The focus on the individual’s responsibility is seen once again; you have been 
given the freedom of choice, now it is up to you. Consequently, I argue that the state`s policy 
on self-improvement have been internalized, as the rural mass also views itself as ‘in need of 
development’. 
We have already proved that the suzhi and wenming discourses are related to a more 
general change from rural-to-urban subjects in China. For that reason, I will now go on to 
explore real examples at the individual level and see how people manage their position in the 
urban sphere and how they try to get the upper hand. I will start by outlining a typical 
situation which shows both the ambiguities the students face and the ways they navigate them 
by playing on their different identities. As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, some 
fields stand out in the social construction of identities, in how extensively they interact at and 
across the boundaries they share with other identities, as well as the labour market, 
consumption and education. It is important to bear in mind that these are analytical fields, 
which in everyday life cannot be studied in isolation, since they interact and react to each 
other in a perpetual game of chess, one move triggering another and creating at times 
conflicting role interpretations. Through this I want to argue in line with Barth (1969) that 
‘Identification is processual, part of the on-going organization of interaction and everyday 
life’ (Jenkins, 2008a:106).  
 
Being successful in the labour market  
According to Jenkins ‘occupational identities are among the most important of social 
identities. For many people they provide the basis on which their livelihood is secured. They 
are also closely connected to social status’ (2008:205). As I have implied above, the discourse 
of suzhi is a powerful motivation for graduate migrants to get ahead and realize their dreams 
and goals. Hence, I will now move on to analyse how successfully finding or creating a job is 
an important mechanism to improve the self.  
 
‘Do you want to do business together? I can help you in China and you can help me in 
Norway? Together we can be successful!’ This was one of the first conversations I had with 
Xuemei, a 25 years old girl that had been living in Beijing for two years when I met her in 
Xiwang Cun. She had a degree from Yunnan University in public management and was the 
only one from her class that had left for Beijing. She had come by herself without knowing 
 59 
 
anyone, which was a bit unusual because most people migrating do so through a network of 
either family or friends. Upon arriving in Beijing she had decided to get to know as many 
people as possible so she could establish a good network, as that was the only way to succeed 
in the city.   
After arriving in Beijing she worked as an intern for a magazine. For many rural 
graduates this is a typical position to get when arriving in urban areas. This is becoming more 
and more typical a job for migrating graduates, and in most cases they are not being paid. This 
is also the case for many of the people I met in Xiwang Cun. For Xuemei, as for most people 
interning, the pay was very unstable and she was not hired as a full-time employee. She found 
this situation very stressful and therefore terminated her engagement after two years. Still, it 
had provided her with contacts and knowledge of how to ‘work’ the city; she knew how and 
with whom to build guanxi –networks. Several times later she said that she did not like 
Beijing, but it was the best place to do business and make guanxi.  
 
 ‘I came to Beijing to find myself’. ‘Have you found yourself?’, I replied. ‘I’m 
still working on it’, she said. ‘I am happier in Yunnan, but will live a better life in 
Beijing. Here I get the chance to improve myself. I miss Yunnan a lot, but there 
are no opportunities to improve there. I also want to help others, but it is not that 
easy back home, then Beijing is more suitable’. 
 
Daughter of an accountant father and an entrepreneuring mother that had been responsible for 
a small shop since Xuemei was a baby; she already knew many aspects of running a shop and 
took advantage of the opportunities that came by. As I got to experience from the first day, 
she was constantly trying to find new ways to increase revenue for the date cake shop she ran 
together with her boyfriend and best friend from college.  
Xiwang Cun was, as mentioned in chapter one, filled with small shops offering cheap 
and fast food to the passing graduates and migrants. The competition was tough, so it was 
important to find ways to attract people who did not have much money to spare for leisure 
items like cake and snacks.  
 
One day Xuemei had placed a vivid green mint plant on a table outside the food 
stall. This immediately drew customers and other curious people to the shop. 
‘What kind of plant is that? I have never seen anything like this before! Why do 
you put a plant out (on the stall) like that?’ In the end she replied; ‘Do you  not 
know what that is? It is a mint plant, you can find it everywhere in Yunnan where 
I am from!’ She then went on to tell them that the 
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Yunnanese food and that it is beneficial for your health. Furthermore, similar 
beneficial effects could be obtained through eating date cakes, which was also 
very good for your skin. People gave approving nods to what she was saying and 
some of them said that they had heard something similar before. 
 
Through displaying what was seen as symbols of Xuemei’s local identity, she managed to 
catch the attention of many people that strolled past the shop. This created a positive effect for 
her, and her local identity was something that people associate with the product they sold. 
Hence, self-image and public image, the internal-external dialectic position of individual 
identification (Jenkins, 2008b:51), are shown to both be at play here. 
Although people have some control over the signals they send to others, we are all at a 
disadvantage in that we cannot know with certainty how they are received or interpreted. 
Hence the importance of what Goffman (1959) calls ‘impression management strategies’ in 
the construction of identity. These dramatize the interface between self-image and public 
image. Impression management draws to our attention the performative aspects of identity 
and the fact that identification is a routine aspect of everyday life (Jenkins, 2008b:20). This 
said, we have to look at the interaction, the boundaries if you will, to understand how these 
performative aspects of social identity are established. One of the main critiques against 
Goffman’s framework is that it takes on the world as a play, acted out almost as if one had a 
script that stated the motivation of the almost hollow-shelled individual actor (Jenkins, 
2008b:70). To overcome that barrier, we can examine Barth`s model on ethnic and social 
identity, where the identities are ‘fluid, situationally contingent, and the perpetual subject and 
object of negotiation’(Jenkins, 2008b). Barth (1969) holds that identification is something that 
is found and negotiated at the boundaries in the encounters between the internal and the 
external identification. This makes identities processual, relational and dynamic, ever-
changing and ever-evolving depending on the context (Ferguson, 1999). 
In the case of Xuemei we are not talking about an ethnic group, but rather a local 
identity with certain characteristics and exotic features. Xuemei often sang Yunnanese songs 
in the local dialect or played pipa35. By drawing out special provincial markers she was able 
to draw attention to certain features that were labelled as positive about her background and 
again made her a successful businesswoman. Xuemei herself was Han-Chinese with some of 
their ethnic features, which also drew attention in an area where there weren`t many people 
from Yunnan province. Stereotypically, Yunnanese people are often of minority background, 
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have certain ‘southern’ facial features often perceived as being pleasant-looking, while the 
province itself is seen as having good climate and spicy food. At the same time Yunnan is 
considered a backward province with a large rural population and therefore its inhabitants’ 
suzhi is also considered to be low.  Xuemei was asked if she too belonged to a minority and it 
was important to her to point out that she was a Han-Chinese, playing on their ‘imagined’ 
common history or relation between her and the majority of Chinese people. Thus, I argue 
that she displayed and used her local identity where she saw it fit and where it could result in 
some kind of advantages for her, thereby echoing both Goffman and Barth emphasis on the 
actor’s agency in the negotiations of their identity. Through a successful negotiation of her 
identity she was also able to reflect a successful self that did well in business and thereby also 
established herself as ‘improved’.  
That being said, I did also observe how, when faced with others who did not know her 
background or that she lived in Xiwang Cun, she downplayed this role and highlighted her 
other strengths and resources, as this had implications for the quest to ‘improving the self’. As 
we saw in chapter one, this is related to the stigma of urban villages like Xiwang Cun, but 
now I move on to another aspect of identity negotiation: how can we know with certainty that 
the signals that we are sending out are received and interpreted in the ‘correct’ way? That is to 
say ’the intent and meaning that we send out our signals with’ (Jenkins, 2008b:22). 
 
Negotiating an improved identity through consumption 
 
It is not enough to assert an identity. That identity must also be validated (or not) 
by those with whom we have dealings. Identity is never unilateral.  
 
‘(Jenkins, 2008b:19) 
 
In the processual dialectic performance that social identities are being shaped through, 
Goffman emphasise some characteristics for how this interactions game is played out. First of 
all the self-presentation is a matter of performance. Second of all, as we will come back to 
later, there is not a single, consistent self, but rather a variety of revelations of the self. 
Furthermore, creating a social identity depend on a constant negotiation between the desired 
presentation of self and other, where one`s history and present situation is of particular 
importance. Lastly, and what we will now move on to, is the need of validation of the 
performance by others. Without their collaboration, the success of social selfhood is on stake 
(Jenkins, 1994:204). In this section I will also argue that the rural student try to undertake a 
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legal belonging in the urban areas through consumption. The degree to which the students are 
able to carry their urban identity with sufficient persuasion is, I argue, the same as to what 
degree their performance have been accepted and validated by others. As the opening quote of 
this paragraph state, identity is never unilateral, which is why I will now move to two 
episodes that disclose how social identity is processed/played out in real life and also point to 
some features that are critical in the negotiation of an improved identity. These at time 
conflicting roles are played out according to the situation they are expected to perform, but 
are also creating dilemmas and non-realistic role distinctions. First we will turn to an episode 
where Xuemei is accused of being something other than her ‘true self’. 
 
 ‘You look like a Singaporean!’ Xiang commented to Xuemei. She was sitting on 
the back of the three wheel motorbike that her boyfriend Huang had rented. They 
were about to leave for the whole sale market to buy products for their store. 
Xiang, which often looked after their shop while they were away, continued to 
steer at Xuemei who pulled her ivory white silk gloves higher up her arms to 
avoid any sunlight to tan her skin. She was wearing big sunglasses and a long 
sleeved jacket, even it fit was hot outside, and an umbrella to fight of the rays of 
sun36. Xuemei looked at Xiang and replied; ’You do not know what a Singaporean 
look like, this is the style now!’ Then she drove off with Huang to the market 
leaving Xiang and the shop behind. 
 
A couple of months later I observed the following incident  as Xuemei was getting ready for a 
concert she had been invited to; 
 
There was Chinese pop music which was streaming out of the computer sang by a 
female sing. The romantic lyrics were performed in a very poetic-dramatic and 
suave way. Xuemei was busy getting ready for the Yunnan concert she was 
attending later the same afternoon. I had been invited too so I could ‘get the 
chance to listen to some to Yunnan music’ and where she ‘could meet friends and 
establish new contacts’ [guanxi]. It was early summer and the weather was getting 
warmer. Huang and Xiang were lying on the bamboo linen which was spread out 
on the bed underneath the air-con which they had just turned on. Huang and 
especially Xiang loved the music playing. Xiang often sang along with the song, 
as well as pulling of imitations of Peking Opera singers. The funny, often 
sarcastic lyrics and rhymes, and considered to be almost an art to perform. This 
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 Having white, flawless skin is something that is almost looked up as a virtue in China and the rest of Asia as it 
demanded hard work to protect and nourish it. In China, like many other countries where agriculture is still form 
the backbone of the labour market, the associations people have with tanned or dark skin is that of a farmer 
working out on his or her plot of land in the sunshine. It is the very symbol of a rural, uncivilized subject which 
stands in opposition to the urban, modern subject.   
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would always get people to laugh, as his improvised text and movements were 
well performed.  
While Xuemei was still hectically trying figuring out was she was going to 
wear that evening Xiang suddenly said: ‘You only listen to that kind of Western 
classical music’, referring to the concert she was going to. ‘You do not listen to 
Chinese music, thinking it is so much better!’ Xuemei looked at him and 
defensively replied: ‘You do not understand this kind of music [Western classical 
music]. And, I do listen to Chinese music!’ Then she started to sing a Chinese 
love song and both Xiang and Huang exclaiming praise for her lovely voice and 
she was again one of them. 
 
In the examples above we can see that there is constant negotiation in the creation of an 
urban, improved identity with the desired presentation of the self on one side and the 
reciprocity needed from the other involved in this kind of presentation. In the first example 
Xuemei brushes aside the statement that she looks like a Singaporean; while in the other she 
try to show her loyalty to the ‘in-group’. What does this tell us about identity making? I argue 
that we have to see identity as something in the making and always under construction and 
depend on the context and situation. Hence, it is a constant process and something the 
individual is always faced with in the evaluation system on whether you are in our out, or in 
this case urban or rural. 
 While Xuemei in the first episode accused for being ‘Singaporean’, which does not 
necessarily automatically make sense? Without going too much into the history of China and 
Singapore, which is outside the scope of this thesis, I can say that the diplomatic ties between 
the two countries have improved the last decade. In addition there have been several cases 
where Chinese celebrities have taken up citizenship in Singapore37. Becoming a Singaporean 
gives you freer reins with no passport restricts, social welfare, no one child policy and a 
general higher standard of living. In order words, it means something different and in many 
cases the opposite of what China is. 
In the second episode Xuemei is accused of putting Western music above Chinese 
music, ‘thinking it is so much better’. There is a difference in value between the two music 
preferences, like in the case of dressing, which is what Xiang points out in his statements. He 
is making an evaluation of the impression Xuemei made expression that she is different, or 
trying to be different, and at least something else than what he and the others were. It is not 
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 Some of the more famous ones are Gong Li and Jet Li. Gong Li`s case is of particular interest as it received 
much attention in mainland China. She was voted the most beautiful woman in China in 2006, and most hated 
Chinese celebrity in 2008 when crossing over to Singapore ‘forgetting her roots and social responsibilities’ in 
China. 
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enough to ‘dress up’, literarily, in an identity. It is under constant negotiation in a process of 
validating the self as performed in reference to the history which makes up life and the 
context frame it is presented and acted in. On the basis of this the surroundings can act and 
react upon the presentation given, either validating the performance given, or as is the cases 
here the lack of collaboration by the other actors sets the success of the social selfhood on 
stake. ’Not only do we identify ourselves in the internal-external dialectic between self-image 
and public image, but we identify others and are identified by them in turn’ (Jenkins, 
2008b:20). 
Faced with the conflicting roles that were played out in these two situations Xuemei 
was faced with a dilemma, how to react to this threat towards her social identity? In both 
cases she claims that Xiang is wrong and that she is right. ‘Identification by others has 
consequences. It is the capacity to generate those consequences and make them stick which 
matters’ (Jenkins, 2008b:20-21). She was denying the ascribed identity of a Singaporean on 
the background of Xiang’s ignorance in relation to fashion, placing the power of definition 
within a feminine sphere, hence out of his reach. Thereby minimalizing the effect Xiang’s 
identification of her as a Singaporean had in relation to the social identity she was trying to 
construct.  
In the second case music taste was contested as Xiang claimed that Xuemei preferred 
Western music, henceforth, not in touch with her Chinese roots. This is dismissed with her 
singing a Chinese song which act as a proof her affiliation with her Chinese background. 
Moreover, this can also be seen in a larger nationalistic discourse, but due to the scope of this 
thesis I will not go further into this here.  
These two situations further show that identity is managed by the context or the 
situations that the interaction happens in and that the creation on a social identity is dynamic 
and improvised according to the situation. Neither is more or less real but exists at the same 
time complementing each other in the interpretation of a social identity. While Barth has been 
criticized for focusing too much on the free will and choice of the actors, and not on the 
aspects of power that the actors were caught in(Banks, 1996). This does not invalidate Barth 
original contribution with more stress on subjective view of identity as being exchanged in a 
free market-place of identity choice (Banks, 1996, Jenkins, 2008a). Like we just saw in the 
example with Xuemei and who got the power to define who is in and who is out, is an 
important aspect of the play that the process of social identity making is caught up in. 
While have in this section see that the process of shaping a social identity is never 
unilinear, as it is not enough to assert an identity, but that it must also be validated by others. 
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In the two cases mentioned about the ‘significant other’ where Xiang did not validate the 
social identities that Xuemei were trying to negotiate, but also how she was the one with the 
defining power to whether or not the identification would stick or not, as she redefined the 
validation question into areas where she was in power. Hence, it is important to include a 
power aspect to these encounters of social identification. I will now return to Meili, whom we 
meet in the beginning of this chapter, and look at the dimension education keep playing in the 
rural graduates lives in their aim to improve their abilities and thereby their chances of social 
mobility.  
 
Improve your abilities – improve yourself 
Becoming educated is what forms the backbone on the suzhi discourse as we have saw in 
chapter two. The thought that through the written word one can cultivate the self to a higher 
quality have become the mantra. As we remember from the beginning of this chapter Meili 
had come to the city to improve herself and explore new paths. An important step in this 
transformation was to learn English, since this would according to her be an important 
stepping stone in establish her own wine company38.  
When I met Meili she was overenthusiastic to get a new foreign friend who spoke 
Chinese, because that meant I could help her with her English. She had moved to Beijing a 
month earlier against her parents will. Her mother had cried and her father had not been 
thrilled either. The thought of her, a single girl, going alone to the big city was not a happy 
one. A topic that came up several times during the time I knew her was that Yunnan was not 
the right place for her and that Beijing was much better. However, depending on the situation 
this did often change. When I asked if she had gotten used to Beijing and if she liked it she 
replied no, she liked Yunnan better. ‘Life in Beijing is tiring, and to get up early in the 
morning is not good for my health’. While at the same time as she was tired of the life in 
Beijing and missing Yunnan she did not want to go back. ’There is nothing for me there 
[Yunnan]. I want to improve myself’. The solution was to stay in Beijing where she could 
learn English, and which she did through getting herself an English language exchange. This 
we will come back to in the next chapter.    
While Meili came to the city to become educated and learn English the proper way, 
there was also still a though among my interlockers that when going went tough education 
was the answer that could give them the little extra in competition again the others. An 
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 As I will argue in chapter 4 some people like Meili use consumption to create a space for themselves in the 
urban spheres. 
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illustration of this was when the date cake shop of Xuemei, Huang and Meili started to do 
worse. One day I found Xuemei studying on her own in her apartment, reading books on law 
and consumer rights. When I asked why, she just said that it was interesting for her and that it 
was also very useful for her business plans. Moreover, she was trying to persuade Huang to 
start studying again. ‘He should really develop his abilities’, she said. ‘Then we can start 
working with something else and start with another business. And he should try to learn 
something from his uncles back home.’ I was asking if they wanted to leave Beijing and she 
said no, Beijing is where the opportunities are.   
These are examples on how these fields of business, consumption, language are 
analytical terms which are good to think with, but far less easy to separate in the everyday 
chaos of signals and symbols that we all live inn, both conscious and unconscious. Through 
the consumption of language, language is again used in business relations and situations, 
which again says something about how promising business woman or man you are and how 
far you can reach. 
 
Concluding remarks 
Improving oneself is an urban, intangible quality that could only be obtained in urban areas 
and not where the rural graduates were from. This meant that they did not only migrate to the 
cities for economic gains, but also to catch the urban quality which could lead to improving 
the self. The individuals in Xiwang Cun are trying to make this as tangible as their can in their 
everyday interactions with others, either consciously or unconsciously. 
They all felt a ambiguity towards the life in the city, still even when this were rough 
they did not want to move back because the city was perceived as being the only place of they 
could improve themselves. Seen in this light, it is still important to recognize that most people 
are ambivalent about staying in the city and the present situation, but my informants kept 
repeating that there were no other opportunities and that Beijing was the best place to be, 
despite the tough reality they faced in their everyday life. As we will see in chapter five a 
meaningful participation in the greater special environment requires that they present 
acceptable social identities. Since the identity of the students as well as of rural population in 
general is stigmatized by their status as rural people, this process of social adaption becomes 
particularly crucial. In the next chapter I change my approach a look at how the rural 
graduates try to claim an urban membership through consuming at fast-food chains, 
transforming eating places to social space. 
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4 The symbolism of fast-food 
 ‘I like restaurants like this, they have a nice atmosphere. It makes me feel good. The food is 
better too, not like the food in Xiwang Cun, which does not taste good. That place [Xiwang 
Cun] is dirty and luan!39’, Meili told me as we sat in a Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) 
restaurant in Wudaokou district waiting for her English language exchange to arrive. She, like 
most of my informants in Xiwang Cun, often chose fast-food places like KFC or Chinese fast-
food restaurants when meeting up with friends. In the previous chapters I have already argued 
that improving oneself is not purely an economical achievement, it`s also about governance of 
Chinese moral experience and how this is expressed by the individuals in their everyday 
practices. I argue that these places were chosen for more reasons than just being a place to eat. 
Taking the ‘fast’ out of ‘fast-food’, the activities at these places were not centered around the 
actual consumption of food, but rather the consumption of an atmosphere that was 
‘comfortable’ and ‘good’. In this chapter I will focus on the transformation of places of food 
consumption In China, fast-food places in particular, to social spaces where the graduates tries 
to construct a social space and identity for themselves in the urban sphere, while at the same 
time ’improve themselves’ and supporting the state by being a good ‘consumer citizen’. In 
addition, the fast-food places stood in stark contrast to the cheap Chinese restaurant in 
Xiwang Cun. Questions on what you consumed and what that meant in correlation to what 
you identified with was therefore I argue a way to show off their loyalty a perceived urban 
lifestyle, but also a way of ‘feeling good’.  
As I show through my empirical material this process we investigate in the last 
chapter, can sometimes create tensions when ‘the rules’ of the sphere they are trying to be a 
natural part of are ‘broken’. Consumption of eating places and things can be seen as critical 
way for the rural graduates in ‘defining their social status and changing power relation’(Yan, 
2009:209) in an extension of the quality politics promoted by the Chinese state. Furthermore, 
the dual process where there rural graduates are being ‘untied’ through the market and 
institutional reforms (educational reforms, closure of the direct job assignment system, etc.), 
while on the other side the state is managing the individualization through drawing the 
boundaries and regulation directories (Yan, 2009: xviii).  As the government have ‘forced’ 
people to become individualistic through the market, though only within the limits of the 
market, creating a new kind of social space. I want to argue in line with other scholars40 that 
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 See for example Halskov Hansen and Svarverud (2010) and  Hoffman (2010) 
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the emergence of a Chinese form of individualism combines global processes with local 
practices (Yan, 2009: xxi). To better understand the historical context the individuals in 
Xiwang Cun stand in today I start by offering an introduction into the emergence of a new 
consumption culture in China and that the new social space that opens up in the fast-food 
places are also facilitating a  remaking of the Chinese individual. 
 
The emergence of a new consumption culture in China  
Consumption as a phenomenon has in the last 10-15 years become a central aspect of rural 
and urban Chinese lives and has been actively supported and encouraged by the party-
government(Fleischer, 2010, Schein, 2001). This new consumption where individual desires 
and pursuits of material comforts are freely celebrated in public spheres  stands in stark 
contrast to earlier decades in China where Chairman Mao proclaimed bu yao langfei- [we] do 
not want to waste anything! There has been a shift from under-consumption during the Maoist 
period to mass-consumption in the post-Mao era, to a formation of consumerism as the new 
and dominant ideology in the late 1990’s (Yan, 2009, Croll, 2006) has also changed the 
reality the students live in. From a party-state sponsored process of making a good socialist 
person, where the ethics were focused on self-sacrifice and hard work, it evolved into a moral 
process of making a new post-socialist consumer with focus on self-realization and pursuit of 
personal happiness in concrete materialistic terms. However, the various ways to keep the 
individual distinctiveness and maintain, or create, status ensured a perpetual momentum for 
the growing mass consumption. One of the most noticeable changes this brought on the 
former ‘classless’ socialist country was former Maoist dressed people that had the money 
could redefine their social status in terms of a new consumed lifestyle(Yan, 2009:224). You 
could now be what you purchased, which is the very essence of the symbolic social 
construction of consumption and the key to understand why fast-food places have become so 
popular in Beijing. 
On the background of the brief outline of the political consumer history of China 
above one can understand that the emergence of fast-food41 chains in the country is a recent 
phenomenon. American fast-food chains started to show interest in the huge potential the 
market China had in the 1980`s, just as Deng Xiao Ping`s opening up reforms started to attract 
the first foreign investors. When KFC opened its first store in Beijing in 1987, and 
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 Kuaicai is the Chinese translation of fast-food, a termed used only for Western-style fast-food or the new 
Chinese style imitations of fast-food in Beijing and not for traditional fast-food. Even if there are native 
forms of xiaochi and hefan which are much faster made and eaten they are not put in the same category(Yan 
2009; 245-246) 
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McDonald`s42 right after in 1992, the customers were struck by their appearance. The new 
fast-food chains had seating areas that were well-lit, had air condition, quick service, a 
welcoming staff and room for more than 500 people. How great an impression this made on 
people can only be understood in relation to the socialist canteens that had been implemented 
after 1949. Now the private sphere of eating together with your family was gone and everyone 
should eat together in collective cantinas.  Even if this was one the way out in the 1980`s 
when the first foreign fast food china arrived, the socialist canteens architectural and 
decoration ‘had to match the rank of a restaurant in an officially prescribed hierarchy (...) 
There were strict codes regarding what a restaurant should provide, at what price, and what 
kind of customers it should serve in accordance with its position in this hierarchy (Yan, 
2009:246-247).  
Shortly after the first introduction of KFC and McDonalds the success of Western fast-
food was a fact. This led to hundreds of businesses copying the model of KFC and they 
mushroomed around China in what was named ‘the war of fried chicken’. This said, simply 
imitating Western food soon proved to be a failed plan. Despite turning to Chinese cuisine 
and offering lower prices than the imported fast-food, the Chinese brands failed to satisfy the 
consumer expectations of ‘the fast food experience’. While the Chinese fast-food chain had 
invented old news in a different wrapping, the ‘Western fast-food restaurants offered local 
consumers a new cultural experience symbolized by foreign fast-food, enjoyable spatial 
arrangements of objects and people, and American-style service and social interactions‘(Yan, 
2009:246-252). They were not just selling fried chicken wings, but a new ‘imagined 
cosmopolitanism’(Schein, 2001).  
Even if McDonald`s have been successful in China, KFC have been one step ahead. 
Contrary to the situation in the rest of the world KFC have two stores to every McDonald`s 
store in China. This have proved an intriguing case for many brand researchers, and many 
argue that KFC have reached this special position not only because they were the first 
Western fast-food brand in China, but they have also been more successfully in adjusted their 
product to the local taste and changed from a purely American image to a modern Chinese 
image in the 2000’s. While McDonald are selling a US burger in China, KFC are selling 
‘dragon twisters’, ‘fried shrimps with Peking sauce’ and other specialized Chinese traits (Liu, 
2008b). This resulted in a shift towards McDonald’s and KFC no longer being as exotic and 
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 McDonald`s opened in Wangfujing, Beijing, the commercial center of Beijing. It quickly became an important 
landmark and as late as 2011 it was the set meeting palace of the jasmine revolution that never took-off in 
China. 
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foreign as before. Rather, they had slowly been assimilated into part of the local foodscape. 
Yan (2009) notes from his interviews with children at McDonald`s Beijing in 2006 that they 
‘did not know about the US origins of the Big Mac, and many others simply did not care 
about the origins of any non-Chinese food’ (Yan, 2009: xxxvii)43. The food no longer offered 
the same exotic and innovative experience, and almost all the people I have spoken to classify 
the food either as ling chi- zero food- or chi bu bao, it is not possible to get full from the food. 
Still, my interlockers and millions of other Chinese people continued to go to these 
restaurants, why is that? 
In the next section I will turn to my own empirical material and argue for a new kind 
of sociality in the space provided by the fast-food places44, where people do not go to eat, but 
are allowed to negotiate an individual social identity which they can participate in a urban and 
global sphere. We will start by following Meili to her first among many meetings with her 
English language exchange at KFC. 
 
KFC – meeting place and test ground 
I had met Meili the same day in Xiwang Cun when she asked me if I wanted to come with her 
to Wudaokou, the student district in Beijing. She was meeting her new English language 
exchange; an English girl named Guizhu, and was nervous about going alone. The meeting 
had been arranged through a contact from her English language course at Beijing 
University45.  For the occasion Meili had dressed up in her finest clothes; a baby blue dress 
matching her fake gold accessories and big black glasses. The arrange place for the language 
exchange was KFC. 
Once inside the restaurant we, Meili and I, sat down next to one of the big windows 
facing the street. This was convenient as we could easily spot Meili’s language exchange 
arriving as the only description we had was ‘red hair’. It was comfortable to sit down inside 
the air conditioned room after being out in the frying sun. The seats, tables, and walls were all 
                                                 
43
 Yan also draw an interesting conclusion that both McDonald’s and KFC emphasises the freshness, purity, and 
nutritional value of their foods(instead of their appealing tastes). According to a high-level manager of 
Beijing McDonald`s the receipts for McDonald`s foods were designed to meet modern scientific 
specification and thus differed from the recipes for Chinese foods, which were based on cultural expectations 
(…). This may help to explain that why few customers compared the taste of fast foods to that of traditional 
Chinese cuisine; instead customers focused on something other than the food’(Yan, 2009:252-253) 
44
 Since food is more than just something you eat, but also a way to establish social relations it gives it an 
interesting double aspect. Sharing a meal with someone in China got a very strong symbolic meaning and 
facilitates the construction of new and strengthens relations and is used actively in people’s network building. 
One dimension about this is what food you choose to eat; another is who you are eating with. However, this 
will not be the focus of this chapter. 
45
 Meili never started the English course at Beijing University, which is considered to be one of the most 
prestigious universities in China.  
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painted in light colours; romantic pop music was playing in the background, which together 
with the milky white counters, stainless-steel kitchenware created a professional feeling. The 
menu was presented both above and on the counter with pictures, which made it easy for new 
customers to pick their own menu, adjusted to both their wallet and personal flavor. 
Employees wore uniforms that were in bright colours, while smiling at customers while 
working efficiently. All this created an ambience that was as crisp and fresh as you would 
expect the chicken to be at a fast-food place, and in sharp contrast to traditional Chinese 
restaurants found in Xiwang Cun. The other people present at the restaurant, were mostly 
youth around 18-25 years old and seemed to do nothing else but to hanging out. They were 
either reading books, studying or talking with their friends. I observed very few people 
actually eating anything while they were sitting there and most were only nibbling on some 
left-over French fries. Taking the ‘fast’ out of ‘fast-food’, the people there used the services 
provided by KFC, and did not seem to be there for a quick and cheap meal before running off 
to the next destination; KFC was the consumption destination. 
While we were waiting for Meili’s language exchange she discussed with me what to 
order. She made it clear to me from the start that she wanted to treat her language exchange 
for food at KFC and dinner later. ‘I do not like going AA [go Dutch]’, she said. ‘That is the 
Western way of doing it. I prefer the Chinese way [treating your guest for food]. My teacher 
told me that is was not necessary, but I do not care, I still want to do it’. Not long after Guizhu 
arrived and Meili took the first chance she had, after making sure it was the right ‘red hair 
girl’, of explaining that she wanted to treat her for food. Seen from a Chinese point of view 
this is a very unusual and almost rude way of approaching your guests when you want to treat 
them for a meal. Normally the host would try to pay without the guest noticing it, and thereby 
saving the face of both parts. On beforehand Meili and I had practiced a sentence tried in 
English that we had been practicing before her language exchange arrived, she wanted to treat 
her for dinner. Unfortunately Meili did not remember the sentence so I had to step in and 
translate. Since I was not supposed to be there in the first place and that this was a language 
exchange, Meili`s language exchange was rather taken aback. It soon became clear that 
Guizhu already had dinner plans that evening. Still, Meili ran away and bought us food for us 
after all; pommes frites, soda water and ice cream. Even if it is highly unusual to start a 
conversation like that in China, it pointed to something very important for Meili, she wanted 
to show that she was Guizhu`s economical peer. Sharing the bill in China could in some cases 
mean the same as admitting that you do not have a lot of money, and normally the one 
inviting that is paying for the dinner.   
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The situation above does not explain why Meili did choose KFC as the place to meet 
her new language exchange? And why so many of my interlockers hung out at fast-food 
places? I believe an answer demands a multi-facet explanation. First of all, and maybe the 
most obvious one, there are few spaces available for leisure activities and meeting friends in 
areas like Xiwang Cun, unless you want to go internet café or a brothel. The structure of 
urban villages are as we discussed in chapter one a temporary and unplanned one, adjusted to 
the demand for cheap rental places, not leisure places. Therefore KFC and other fast-food 
places becomes a free space they can appropriate and use for whatever purpose they wish. 
This is made even clearer if we think back at the description of how people appropriated the 
space in KFC. Second of all, I believe KFC creates a framework for assimilation into an 
urban, or even a global sphere. In Meili’s case it provided her with a possibility to show to her 
Western language exchange that she knew how to be a natural part the urban sphere. KFC 
represented something clean, ‘developed’ and modern. By consuming at a place like KFC she 
would through eating there embody modernity and in the very essence embody qualities she 
wanted to obtain in order to ‘improve her’. Lastly, it was a place where consumption was no 
longer connected to ‘being good’ in the socialistic way, but rather focused towards ‘feeling 
good’. Meili often repeated that she really like the ambience of places like KFC since it made 
her feel good and made her want to go back. Normally meals are looked upon as a very social 
thing in China, and if you are eating along you are almost looked upon as an outsider, and not 
a part of a social whole. Though, with the changing lifestyle in the cities this is, I argue, just 
another sign of a rising individual in China. The fast-food places catered to a consumer mass 
that wanted to appropriate a social space where they could feel well, even if that meant by 
themselves. Moreover, for many girls which traditionally should not be out alone, this created 
a space where they could be safe from social discrimination and free to create their own 
lifestyle.  These restaurants provided an arena outside state control, where individual desires 
and aspirations where celebrated in public, as well as a public embrace of modernity (Yan, 
2009:229).  
However, as we saw in the last chapter, social identities are never unilateral, and must 
always be validated by others in order to pass successfully. As I argue in the next section, it`s 
not enough ‘dress up’ in an identity, you have to be that identity and recognized by others, in 
this case, an imagined urban sphere.   
  
Tensions in new, appropriated social space 
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While the language exchange meeting between Meili and Guizhu was a weekly event where 
they met at KFC most of the times, she also arranged meetings at cafes that she said had a 
‘comfortable atmosphere [qifen]’. These cafes, also relatively new to the consumer market in 
China, were like the KFC a mix between Chinese and Western or Asia style. At these places 
Meili was almost always trying to show her preference for urban thing, but did almost every 
time make ‘mistakes’ revealing her unfamiliarity with the unwritten rule of the new 
appropriated social space. She was lacking the cultural capital necessary to convince people 
that she was a part of the sphere that she tried to be a part of. I will now analyse two situations 
which describes how cafes and restaurants can be a window into understanding the cultural 
symbolism of food consumption and the many invisible social ‘traps’ waiting for the 
uninitiated rural subject when entering the urban sphere. I apply Goffmans’s analytical 
framework on the situational analysis in understanding the actions of the social interactors and 
how they their reactions can be understood specifically in accordance with the norms of 
interactions in the particular situation, and moreover in a more general interpretation of the 
consequences this have for the subject trying to appropriate these new social spaces, which is 
the focus on this chapter. First of is an incident that was played out in a café where Meili was 
meeting her language exchange.  
 
Meili and I sat down on each our site of the table and sunk into the deep sofas. Around us 
there where shelves filled with books and magazines, as well as seating groups with both 
chair and couches. The café was almost filled with youths in their twenties from all nations, 
mainly Chinese and from other Asian countries, which was due to its location in the student 
district. A waitress came over to our table handed us the menu and left again. While I was 
taking advantage of the Wi-Fi there Meili tried to decide what she was going to have. After a 
long time she finally decided on a coffee, and not just a regular black coffee, but a double 
macchiato with a glass of vanilla essence on the side. When I asked her why she choose that 
specific coffee she replied that the name sounded funny and that she had never tried it before; 
quickly assuring me that she had drunken coffee before in Yunnan, but not so much in 
Beijing.  
The waitress returned and took our orders. Then, Meili pulled out a 100 Yuan note and 
waved it in front insisting on paying for both her and me. The waitress got a bit embarrassed, 
looked at me like a big question mark, before turning to Meili again telling her that she could 
pay at the counter when she left. This time it was Meili’s turn to look confused. Not fully 
understanding what the waitress just had said to her, she waved the money in front of her 
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again. However, now the waitress just glanced at her and said sorry before she left the table 
with our orders. While Meili was left puzzled and did not understand why her money was 
valid, I tried to explain to her that in this café you ate first and paid upon leaving. This is not 
uncommon in Chinese restaurants in China, but you are not denied to pay upfront either if that 
is what you want. An arrangement like they had at this café is often sued to avoid any 
unfaithful waitresses to be tempted to put money in their own pocket.  Though, Meili’s ability 
to recognize that she had made a ‘mistake’ and act accordingly did not happen. Instead she 
continued to insist on paying, which was met with a puzzled waitress that could not accept her 
money due to the rules of the restaurant.  
As Goffman(1959) argue, miscommunication as the one described and analysed above 
often occur in intercultural encounters, where impression management becomes more 
challenging since the subjects have different social backgrounds, hence, different tools to 
interpreter the situation presented to them. In the case of Meili above, her refusal  to give in 
and resist the norms she was confronted with resulted in a break down in the communication 
where to only way to save some ‘face’ for both parts was that the waitress broke of the 
conversation and left the table. Meili could not buy her accept into a social sphere where she 
did not have the social capital46 to go with the economic capital. This also mirrors what 
Bourdieu wrote about economic capital, that is cannot always be transferred to other kinds of 
capitals, and some things like for example social or cultural capital, which often overlap, can 
in many cases be habituated (Bourdieu, 1986). This said, the habituated knowledge is not 
always an advantage in the process of managing a desirable social identity that conform with 
the social space one want to be a part of. Often these habituated proprieties are performed 
unconsciously, which challenge the management of the impression one want to give.  
A situation that spelled out this difficulty clearly occurred when I came with Meili one 
day to eat at the Japanese shopping mall next to Xiwang Cun.  She had chosen a Japanese 
noodle restaurant for the occasion which both of us liked. The seating in the restaurant similar 
to KFC and other fast-food chains, but here the majority of the space was adjust for single 
persons or couples with small tables paired with two chairs, while there was only a few tables 
with space for more than two people. I will come back to the implications these seating 
arrangement have in a larger setting in the next section, while here it mentioned to point out 
                                                 
46
 Social capital ‘is the aggregate  of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable 
network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition- or in other 
words, to membership in a group-which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectivity –
owned capital, a ‘credential’ which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word’ (Bourdieu, 
1986:248-249). 
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that due to this arrangement of space there was little room between the tables, which meant 
that all your actions and remarks was making up the public space in the restaurant.  
After sitting down at a small table we ordered to bowls of noodle soup and Meili also 
ordered a fried pork chop to eat on the side. There was a couple sitting two tables to the right 
of us eating and whispering in low voices to each other, while the rest of the restaurant was 
quite peaceful as we had managed to get there before the dinner rush. It did not take many 
minutes before we had dinner on the table and started to eat.  Meili took a bit of her pork 
chop, gnawed of all the meat before spitting the left over bone on the floor next two our table. 
She continued eating her soup and occasionally spitting out the thing she did not like on the 
floor without realizing or registering the stunned faces of the couple sitting next to us steering 
at her.  
Seen from an urban Chinese point of view or mine spitting bones and other things on 
the floor were not only unhygienic but also totally unacceptable table manners in a restaurant 
like we were in. If there was something you did not like the proper thing to do was to place it 
on a napkin and leave it on the table, so it was easy for the waitress to pick it up. However, in 
most street corner restaurants in Xiwang Cun and in Yunnan were she was from this was 
nothing to frown upon, rather it was the norm. Considered an easy way to get rid of things 
that were not wanted, not only bones and food stuff would be thrown on the floors in those 
restaurants, but also cigarette butts, bottles and even spitting was a common sight many 
places.  Judging from the shocked faces at the table next to us and this kind of behavior was 
clearly not reconcilable with the social space we were in. The kind of behavior above is often 
described as uncivilized -bu wenming- and a typical lack of quality – suzhi- common for 
people from rural areas.   
As Meili did not realize that embodied ‘bad habits’ from Yunnan created a fuss as she 
continued in the same way, unconsciously exposing her lack of cultural capital to maintain 
and manage a impression of someone that belonged and was a natural part of the urban, 
modern sphere. An interesting parallel here is a description Yan did when interviewing young 
people at McDonalds about their consumer behavior in the fast-food restaurant and how ‘they 
had learned to clean up their tables by observing the foreigners behavior. Several informants 
told me that when the disposed of their own rubbish they felt more ‘civilized’ (wenming) than 
the other customers because they knew the proper behavior (Yan, 2009:257). Whereas in 
‘normal’ restaurants and street corner restaurants in Xiwang Cun, one expect the waitresses to 
take care of the plates and garbage produced from the meal as a part of the packet you have 
paid for, in fast-food restaurants you have to clean up your own garbage. The individual have 
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to take responsibility for their own left overs and move it to the collection stations. Here this 
is a part of the deal of getting cheaper food than many other places. 
To sum up, Meili’s attempt to manage an impression of a valid urban and modern 
social identity in the sphere of a café and fast-food restaurants was made difficult due to two 
factors. First of all she lacked the right social and cultural capital to manage the social space 
she interacted with others in. Failure to manage and avoid the potential ‘traps’ laid out in this 
new social space, this lead to miscommunication and confusion as the situational proprieties 
where not shared between her and the other social interactors. Moving on to the second factor, 
I argue the internalized habits and behavior was fatal in her attempt to consume and assimilate 
into a social space she wanted to be a part of and identified with. In addition missing to realize 
that she was stepping over to the wrong side, or realizing and choosing to ignore it, further 
deepened the impression of her as a rural subject misplaces in the modern and civilized 
restaurant in Beijing.  In order to understand the deep and penetrating implications these new 
social spaces offered by fast-food places and cafes have for the rural graduates I will now 
move on to describe and analyse the space in a street corner restaurant in Xiwang Cun, before 
arguing for consumption as a way for the rural graduates to claim urban membership in a 
sphere where they are the outsiders.  
 
‘Being made’ and ‘self-made’, claiming urban membership through consumption  
Different from the fast-food restaurants described above a street-corner restaurant in Xiwang 
Cun that opened when I was there during my fieldwork did not gain the same kind of attention 
as KFC down at Tiananmen Square. No news reporters were writing about the latest addition 
of hole in the wall restaurants, even if it served donkey meat which was previously only sold 
in the shopping across from Xiwang Cun. There was no crowd standing outside admiring the 
new red sign above the entrance proclaiming that donkey meat was heavenly and good for 
your health. As was the norm in Xiwang Cun, which we will get back to in the next chapter, 
restaurant opened and closed as the seasons changed, and it only took two days to turn a BBQ 
restaurant into a donkey meat restaurant. Next to the entrance there was oven heated with coal 
bricks to make bread for the meat. On the sliding doors hung the red Chinese character fu in 
red colour upside down.  Fu, meaning happiness or fortune, placed like that would ensure that 
fortune came their way. Once inside the small room there were five tables inside with small 
portable chairs sat next to them. On the left hand side of the room a fridge and a small work 
bench was placed. Placed on the work bench was often a big bowl filled with donkey gelatin 
covered with a towel that was served together with the meat in small hamburgers. Above on 
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the wall there hung a poste 1x2 meter long with a list of the dishes they served, price per item, 
and some pictures illustrating some of the dishes. In the back of the room there was a sink 
where all the dished were done and cutlery were stored. They also had an air-condition that 
was only turned on if it was really warm and had customers. Also the light was only turned on 
one it had gotten dark outside. This meant that during daytime the room was lit by dim light 
from outside.  
 Meili and some of my other interlockers often ate lunch there when they were working 
at their shop across the street. They would go there for the food and in the summer also for the 
air-condition. Leftover bones, cigarette butts and whatnot was thrown on the floor. Moreover, 
in contrast to the piece meal packages you got at KFC here one were sharing food from the 
plates placed on the table. While sociality in relation to the actual food consumption in the 
fast-food restaurant was being defined down to an individual serving unit, in Chinese 
restaurants food was being consumed collectively creating a social space focused on the unit 
of people being there. Moreover, some even go as far as to argue that to share food from the 
same pot can be understood as a way ‘blurring class boundaries’ (Yan, 2009: 244). 
Furthermore, people would go to these restaurants because they wanted to eat and get full, not 
because they wanted to enjoy the atmosphere. Even if a meal could last for hours, eating and 
drinking, once one had finished it was normal to leave. It was against the norm to hang around 
without consuming any food items, since that would mean that customers would take up space 
that could be used by other consuming customers. While in KFC we remember that people 
would stay on for hours, nibbling to a few French fries and enjoy the atmosphere.  
 
Croll (2006) argues that consumption in its very essence is ‘the inseparability of the material  
and the social processes involved in that just as persons choose goods so good also play a part 
in the construction of personhood or identity. As persons become consumers, the meanings 
and messages attached to goods play a large part in defining who they are or wish to be and 
signal affiliation to a single or range or social categories and cultural value‘(sic.)(ibid., 
2006:21-22). This might help us to understand why the rural graduate kept going back to the 
fast-food chains even if they continued to complain about the bad food and that they did not 
feel full after eating there. As for the students I argue it was a negotiation between ‘being 
made’ and ‘self-making’(Ong et al., 1996). By ‘being made’ I refer to the process of 
categorization and at times stigmatization that the rural graduates experience and that we 
examined in chapter two. I argue that a way of ‘breaking out’ of these categories as rural: 
urban or traditional: modern are given through the social spaces offered by the fast-food 
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places which opens up for an opportunity to negotiate a ‘self-made ’urban membership 
through consumption and invest in objects they saw as modern and developed. To disregard 
any of the two ‘sides’ mentioned above in this dual process, if not multidimensional process, 
would be to simplify the many configurations that social identity takes among the rural 
graduates.  
Another reason for why consumption is so important in the establishment of an urban 
identity is that the rural graduate students are as we investigated in chapter one illegal subjects 
in the city. Hence, they seek alternative ways to negotiate their presence in the city and trying 
to obtain a ‘consumer citizenship’(Zhang, 2001b). Nevertheless, as we saw in the case of 
Meili, often the rural graduates fail to comply with the norms and codes of the urban sphere 
and thereby continuously fail to get the recognitions they wish for. Let us now look at how the 
consumption of fast-food space links the rural graduates negotiation of social identity to a 
global sphere.   
 
Consequences of consumption -changing social relations 
We started this chapter with a short historical overview to the introduction of fast-food chains 
to China. Through that we learnt that KFC went from being one of the first encounters the 
Chinese people had with American consumer culture, to becoming and almost symbolizing 
the new Chinese consumer culture where people could live out their personal lifestyle and 
embracing a new, global space47. This represented a potential acquisition of a higher status, 
the feeling of being civilized, and as we talked about in the last chapter becoming an 
‘improved self’. For the rural graduates going to fast-food places like KFC was an 
embodiment of a quality inaccessible for them in their native place. Upon arriving the city is 
was within reach, and outside state restrictions, and offered them an opening into an 
‘imagined cosmopolitanism’(Schein, 2001). This notion is tightly connected to the change in 
consumption pattern that we have observed in China the last decades, where an individual’s 
social status have been tied to what it consumes to a larger and larger degree. It is defining not 
only who you are, but also who you want to be. Moreover, this new ‘visibility’ and 
availability of commodities and spaces for consumption have given the rural graduates and 
others a sense of participating in a global community culture (Schein, 2001:227). Whereas 
                                                 
47
 In China the success of American fast-food chains have raised some nationalist concerns as local manufactures 
are not doing as well as their foreign competitors. Due to the scope of this thesis I will not have the case to go 
into this topic with the depth it deserves, so I will only state that also in my material there are strong 
indications that in the domestic market there is a strong nationalistic segment that does influence people`s 
decision on where to consume, making it a highly politicized act.   
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selves are crafted out of aspirations matched with crispy chicken wings and a smile from 
Colonel Sanders at KFC, so are the hierarchized social distinctions tied to judgments of others 
on taste and inclusiveness in the urban, modern sphere the fast-food places. Nonetheless, I 
argue that this is not the only consequence we can see from the embracement of the fast-food 
places among rural graduates. While the consumption of new social spaces represent an 
outwards movement from the individual sphere towards an inclusion into a larger, global 
consumer culture, I argue in the next chapter that there is also a shift in how consumption 
change the relationship between the rural graduates and their family and kin as money and 
resources are invested in the urban sphere instead of sent home to the rural graduates native 
place. 
 
Concluding remark  
This chapter started with a conversation I had with Meili were she said she liked KFC because 
of the atmosphere and it was the opposite of dirty, street-corner restaurants in Xiwang Cun. 
KFC represented something clean, developed and modern. By consuming at a place like KFC 
she would not only eat, but also embody modernity and thereby in the very essence embody 
the qualities she wanted to obtain in order to ‘improve her’ and becoming one of the urban 
sphere. However, as we have seen the negotiation of an urban quality are difficult to manage 
as the rural graduates are no able to show of a relaxed enough performance to be validated by 
others (Bourdieu, 1984). The rural graduates lack the proper capital to succeed in the city, 
unless they managed to put on display through playing convincing role. Money can help you 
to enter the urban scene, but it will not provide you with the knowledge on who to employ it 
on the social scene.  
What I have argued in this chapter is that the appropriation of these new social spaces 
involves highly performative practices in the way people adopt to these places in an attempt to 
negotiate the dual process of ‘being made’ and ‘self-making’ in the Chinese social order that 
the rural graduates find themselves in. The fast-food restaurant stand in contrast to the earlier 
described socialist cantinas which tried to institutionalize the way people socialized in relation 
to food, as well as to control the meal times and taking away the private make demand for a 
new kind of sociality outside state control. That is, the public celebration of individual desires, 
life aspirations, and personal communications in a social context. As Fleischer notes, this new 
focus on spending and consumption ‘plays a crucial role in the reconfiguration of social space 
on present day urban China’ (Fleischer, 2010:109), and also on the individual. 
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5 Creating one`s own rice bowl 
There are many challenges awaiting the rural graduates in the city as we have learnt from the 
previous chapter. As noted in the introduction of this thesis many rural graduates who come to 
Beijing end up underemployed or unemployed. Their prime motive for coming to the city is to 
find a good job and earn money, while at the same time also improve themselves according to 
what they look upon as urban and modern values. While the previous chapter discussed and 
analysed how the rural graduates explored their role in a global sphere, this chapter focus on 
local practices and processes of getting by in Xiwang Cun, more particular on how rural 
graduates became entrepreneurs, managed their business and established new social relations 
in an attempt to ‘create their own rice bowl’ (Hoffman, 2010). In order to become an 
entrepreneur there are certain assets that need to be in place; start-up capital, an organization 
to run the business and customers to buy the different products that are sold. As 
entrepreneurial activities ‘are themselves social and cultural forms that draw their efficiency 
partly from sociocultural resources’ (Smart, 1993:338), this chapter will be an attempt to 
overcome the old dichotomies between economic and noneconomic dimensions. Following 
Appadurai (1986) I try to highlight the calculative dimension present in both market and gift 
exchanges and show how there is also cultural dimension to market exchanges. 
 We saw in the first chapter of this thesis how Xiwang Cun had developed from a 
farmer’s village to an urban village through a process of informality. Without romanticizing 
the margins, as criticized by Das and Poole (2004), I argue that the spaces which opens up in  
Xiwang Cun creates possibilities which had been much harder for rural graduates and to 
obtain in a more ‘managed place’. Even if the state was not present as a regulative 
mechanism, there were different actors who acted as ‘the state’ in the meeting with the rural 
graduates and the businesses in Xiwang Cun. This developed into a complicated play for my 
interlockers as they had to juggle different social roles, between who they wanted to be, and 
who they were perceived as we saw in chapter three, and also navigating between different 
actors in their everyday struggle to manage their business to be successful in Beijing.  
I will now go on to give an account of how three of my interlockers in Xiwang Cun 
came to be entrepreneurs, presented in the form of one case lasting for the 5 months I was in 
Xiwang Cun, which enables me to point at typical trends in the entrepreneurial activities in 
the village. I discuss what assets were involved, how an enterprise could be maintained and in 
the end discuss the need to reconsider the primordial distrust in the market as a place where 
relations are being built. I show that my interlockers are dependent on creating new relations 
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which comes out of their personal network, and not the family or kin network. Moreover, this 
creates new dynamics that one have to reconsider the current thinking about family as the 
only bastion for trust and relations in an ever changing world.  
 
Becoming an entrepreneur 
There are certain features that need to be in place when establishing an enterprise. First there 
is the question of access to capital to cover start-up expenses. Secondly it is important to 
know how to run and manage the business and then thirdly how to attract customers (ref). 
During my time in Xiwang Cun I saw no less than seven businesses open and close within the 
close network of my interlockers. In some cases the shops or restaurants were not successful 
in attracting enough customers, either because of an unfavourable position in the city 
landscape, or they were in tough competition with other similar business. In other cases there 
was a lack of network and relations that could help them out. Typically many people chose 
the ‘traditional’ way through family and kin-relations in bringing together the capital needed, 
while in the case of my interlockers, and many other rural graduates I spoke to, the start-up 
capital was a mix of family money and pooling of resources among friends48. I will now 
outline how three of rural graduates who were my interlockers became entrepreneurs in 
Xiwang Cun. 
 
It was the beginning of April not long after Chinese New Year’s when Huang, 
Xuemei and Meili opened their date cake shop. They had paid 60.000 Yuan for all 
the things needed for the shop and paid a monthly rent of 3000 Yuan49. Huang 
thought it was too expensive for a room which measured 3x3 m2, had wires 
hanging down and a water tap in the corner with only cold water, but, he pointed 
out, ‘it’s our only opportunity’.  
The start-up capital had been brought together from Xuemei`s odd-jobs 
savings in Beijing, Huang`s savings from six years in the Chinese army, money 
given to Meili from her boyfriend, as well as help from the parents of the two 
girls. Neither of the girls came from well-off homes but for their parents this was 
also an investment, as they, according to Meili and Xuemei, considered this to be 
something that would profit them in the future.  
                                                 
48
 In general few people started businesses on their own, but there are exceptions here as well. A 
growing trend was people starting internet companies, a new niche that have opened up in the recent years. 
People with limited recourses can set up their own company and trade with people on the basis of their 
background and how expensive the services are. This demands low capital investment and is also an 
opportunity to reach out to a larger market. 
49
 Which is 1000 Yuan more than an average migrant worker’s monthly salary, which is 2,049 Yuan 
(1,939 NOK) (‘Chinese migrant workers' wages up 21.2%’, Xinhua, April 27, 2012) 
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In the beginning they earned approximately 2000 Yuan on a good day, but 
as a newly established business they kept experiencing teething troubles; burning 
the cake, not using the correct measurements, starting the production to late and 
thereby missing the morning rush of people, and so on. This resulted in no or low 
income some days, which was a hard blow for their frail economy. In addition 
they had to buy fresh ingredients for the cakes; eggs, oil, dates, Chinese brandy, 
and other things which had to be purchased on an almost daily basis at the whole-
sales market close by.  
Their customers where mostly girls concerned with their health, looks and 
ways to improve it , as well as grandparents who wanted to buy that little extra for 
their small ‘princes’ and ‘princesses’. Xuemei and Meili also told me that the date 
fruit was good for the skin according to Chinese medicine, and could be bought 
cheaply through ordering large quantizes at the whole sale market.  Both of the 
girls were good looking which was not bad for advertising either. In addition the 
cake was cheap, which lowered the threshold of buying it. 
 
By bringing together their resources and getting help from home Xuemei, Huang and Meili 
had been able to bring in sufficient economical capital to start their own business and 
attracting customers. There were also close ties between them as Huang was the boyfriend of 
Xuemei, and Xuemei and Meili had known each other since high school which cemented the 
organizational ties of the shop in relations of trust and reciprocity. Moreover Huang’s second 
cousin Jiejie, had been living in Xiwang Cun the last two year with her husband, while 
working at a factory. Now Jiejie was responsible for re-investing their money in a milk tea 
shop, while her husband continued to work at the factory. For Huang, Xuemei and Meili this 
meant extra support in the beginning, since they could learn from each other’s failures and 
success. Jiejie did not have any previous business experience and her husband was working 
long shifts, coming home late every night, so my interlockers also helped her out if there were 
any problems. 
 The establishment of a new business is a very competitive affair and there was a high 
bankruptcy rate among newly established businesses in Xiwang Cun. To avoid economic 
failure some people combined different lines of business, for example running a restaurant by 
day and gambling joint by night. The competition for whatever small change the graduates 
could spare was strong, and the results were observed in sudden disappearance of, replaced by 
a new business the following day. Since the majority of the shops were either family run or 
run by friends the stakes was higher, if they did not succeed it would also have consequences 
outside the immediate family. These processes reflected the transient cycle of life in the 
village and the insecurity related to starting a business. Especially in the beginning it was 
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important to have a steady income in order to cover the start-up expenses. Therefore, once a 
business had been established in Xiwang Cun there was a question of how to further manage 
the investments and create surplus.  
  
Attempts at professionalization and new investments   
Once a shop had been established in Xiwang Cun they would often try to expand their 
business through attempts at professionalization and new investments. In the case of my 
interlockers professionalization meant mirroring what they saw as a modern and civilized 
shop setting up an area that was marked as the opposite, like we seen in chapter one. Such 
investments were however often the result of short-term thinking and the profit from new 
investments where often dependent on the marketing skills of the independent individuals. 
Their choices and intentions often changed over time and brought forth new niches of 
investments.  
 
From the start especially Xuemei was eager to show that the date cake shop was a 
professional business with serious intentions. In the beginning they used their 
normal clothes when working, but one day Xuemei said that this was not a good 
idea after all. ‘It does not look professional’, she continued and pointed at Huang 
whose clothes were full of cake dough. The next day she returned with a white 
uniform for Huang, as well as disposable gloves for handling the cake and face 
masks to wear during the production process. Furthermore, they tried to be more 
careful with washing and clearing the utensils used for the cake production, but 
with only a cold water tap at the back of the room this proved very difficult. As 
we remember from chapter three, Xuemei had a father who was an accountant. 
Xuemei said that he had taught her how to keep a budget and that it was an 
important part of any serious business. She also started to write down all their 
expenses and revenues on a daily basis trying to keep the budget. 
 
Their attempts to professionalize the business reflected the general attitude on how a clean 
and successful shop should be seen from a state point of view. Since the Beijing Olympic 
Games in 2008 there had been a clear focus on cleaning up the street, getting rid of street food 
stalls and any other unwanted elements. One of the first things one notice when walking into a 
restaurant in more central parts of Beijing are the numerous certificates hanging on the walls 
showing that they have a license to run the business and that their health standards are 
satisfying50. Even if this does not exist in Xiwang Cun due to the absence of state regulations, 
                                                 
50
 In Shanghai they even have a ‘satisfaction scale’ hanging at the entrances of the shops, showing 
either a happy face or a neutral face. If you get a sad face you are closed down. There are also rumours 
saying that you cannot get a happy face without a giving a bribe to the health inspectors. 
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it does not mean it is not important to give a ‘high-quality impression’, since that again 
reflected the standard of the people running the shop. If a shop was dirty and worn down 
many people would avoid it and go to a place that looked more pleasing and clean. This 
brings us back to the association between cleanness and civilized –wenming- behavior and 
modern things of the urban sphere which we have discussed and analysed in previous 
chapters. In chapter four Meili expressed several times her preference for ‘urban food’ and 
described food in Xiwang Cun as dirty and having ‘bad taste’. The maintenance and 
management of the shop in a civilized manner was not only important in presenting a well-
functioning shop, but also to get validation from others of the quality and urban identity of the 
owners. However, in an urban village movements and actions are constantly monitored and 
reviewed by potential customers and competing business, which makes it demanding to 
always keep up a presentable image.  
  
In less than two weeks Huang`s new uniform looked like it had been dragged 
through wet mud and the hygienic rules that Xuemei tried to establish gradually 
disappeared and gave way to more ‘practical’ arrangements. Exposable gloves 
were used over-and-over- again, and very soon there were no face masks left. This 
turned the daily routines of the shop into a performance of how a ‘civilized’ and 
clean business should be. All three of them rather sold cake out on the street to 
avoid people seeing the mess that was inside. The accounts went from being 
recorded on a daily basis to being jolted down sporadically. As the shop did worse 
economically, conflicts and accusations of who had taken money for private 
purposes grew. It was Huang in particular who was accused of using money on 
gambling which was not only a waste, but also bad for his ‘quality’. 
 
In line with a capitalistic idealistic argument surplus money from the business was re-invested 
in the shop with the intention of creating an even larger surplus. It is important to remember 
that neither of them had any previous experience with running a business, assessing markets 
nor running promotional campaigns. This resulted in a trial and error method whenever they 
introduced a new product, which was not only time consuming but also wasted a lot of 
resources when making products that could not be sold due to failed products. In the 
following month after opening, they tried to break into new niches; milk tea, fruit juices and 
even popcorn. However, this did not only require capital, but also pushed for the need to buy 
new equipment, which further triggered the move to a larger apartment for Huang and 
Xuemei where they could store all the material. 
All their new products had limited success, but still they kept looking for new ways to 
promote their items and increase their sales numbers. In order to survive in the tough 
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competition against other businesses a large network was necessary and could provide a web 
of security in case something happened, which it did quite often. This brings us over to how 
the rural graduates, traders and my interlockers had to engage in relational work called 
guanxi, loosely translated as ‘social relations’.  
 
Guanxi 
Guanxi is a widely discussed term in studies of Chinese society and has for long been noted 
for its importance in Chinese life, both in urban and rural contexts51. I will here outline some 
characteristics of guanxi. First of all it can be ‘ascribed as primordial traits such as kinship, 
native place, and ethnicity’ (Gold et al., 2002:6). This has traditionally been the basis for ones 
guanxi in China, while extrafamiliar relations have been an extension of this network. This is 
not to say that the extrafamiliar ties are not important as we will see later in this chapter52. 
Further guanxi can be achieved through ‘characteristics such as (…), having shared 
experiences (..) and doing business together’(Gold et al., 2002:6). Moreover, guanxi can also 
be created in interactions where ‘potential business partners may consciously establish or seek 
to manufacture guanxi when no prior basis exists, either by relying on intermediaries or 
establishing a relationship directly’(Gold et al., 2002:6). This makes guanxi resemble 
Bourdieu`s (1986) concept of ‘social capital’53 where the ability to convert one kind of capital 
to another is an important characteristic. I agree with Gold et.al (2002) when they state that 
‘guanxi as social capital is accumulated with the intention of converting it into economic, 
political, or symbolic capital (Gold et al., 2002:7). However, as I will show through my own 
empirical observations briefly, there are important aspects separating guanxi from ‘social 
capital’. 
 Following Kipnis (1997) I will instead of going more into details and the debate  
about what guanxi is, look at how guanxi is produced in the process of interaction between 
people and analyse the context framing those actions. This, I argue, will give us a more 
fruitful approach to understand the rural graduates in their attempt to become successful with 
                                                 
51
 According to Gold et.al. (2002), this has resulted in guanxi ‘becoming a ‘social fact’ in 
Durkheim`s terms. Its significance as a distinctive social phenomenon constraining individual behavior while 
also becoming internalized has resulted in scholars and lay persons utilizing the un-translated Chinese 
word’(Gold et.al., 2002:5).  
52
 As Kipnis notes from his ethnography in a village in North-China there is invested a lot effort in producing 
relationship outside the immediate family (Kipnis, 1997:5). 
53
 Social capital ‘is the aggregate  of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession 
of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition- 
or in other words, to membership in a group-which provides each of its members with the backing of the 
collectivity –owned capital, a ‘credential’ which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word’ 
(Bourdieu, 1986:248-249). 
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their business, while trying to improve themselves. In this game they do not only have to play 
on different social identities, but they also have to relate to different actors in order to stay on 
top of the game. This, however, is very demanding as these are also actors with different 
intentions, values and goals. 
 
Creating horizontal webs of security 
Although the different shops were competitors in Xiwang Cun, there was also group solidarity 
between them. The uncertainty in their everyday business pushed forward the need to 
establish new relations, as many people in Xiwang Cun could not play on their primordial 
traits since many did not have family or kin there. There would be regular exchanges of food 
between the different shops, if someone tried to pay, the receiving part came running after 
her/him and literally threw the money back at them, saying it would offend them if they paid. 
Also when people needed favours or help it was advantageous to have a network to draw on 
in order to operate efficiently. In the case Huang and Xuemei they moved houses three times 
during my fieldwork in Xiwang Cun, much due to the earlier mentioned expansions of their 
business. Every time they moved they called on people to help them, and there was always 
new people showing up. Later when I asked them how they had got to know each other or 
where their contacts were from, the reply was that they had meet randomly and did not really 
know them. In more traditional businesses family would take care of these tasks, but as the 
rural graduates did not have the same kind of network they had to find new ways to construct 
relations with people, making social ties even more important. The actions described here are 
one of features that set guanxi apart from ‘social capital’ as Bourdieu(1986) defined it. 
Guanxi is ‘based implicitly (rather than explicitly) on mutual interest and benefit (Yang, 
1994:1-2) and there is system of gift exchange and favours as we have seen above, which 
again creates obligations and indebtedness, and there is no set time frame for when this should 
be reciprocated (Gold et al., 2002:7, Yang, 1994). 
The described solidarity did only exist as long as the different businesses’ niches did 
not interfere too much or there were no other personal conflicts. In a highly competitive 
environment there were constant rumors about different people and rivaling businesses; who 
could you trust or who could not be trusted, which people were involved in gambling and so 
on. One of the competing businesses that challenged my interlockers was a small BBQ stall,   
where the proprietor was accused of selling lamb meat instead of pork meat, which everyone 
could see by the darker colour. These rumors effectively made clear who was ‘in’ and who 
was ‘out’ in the network, or put another way who was close and who was further away in the 
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relational hierarchy. Moreover these distinctions also showed that ascribed or primordial traits 
of guanxi are not always markers of trust that ensures a relation, rather it can be judged the 
other way around. This can be described through an episode where a girl from Yunnan 
suddenly showed up in Xiwang Cun.  
 
In general there were few Yunnanese people in Xiwang Cun which made Jingjing 
easy to pick out as a newcomer. She dressed in colourful shirts and clothes, and 
walked around in the village looking like a curious child. In addition she had a 
very strong local Yunnan dialect. As far as I understood she had contacted 
Xuemei and Meili, and not the other way around. She asked a lot of questions 
without being able to clarify what she was doing in the city apart from coming 
with her husband who was now working in Beijing as a migrant worker. In the 
week she was in Xiwang Cun Jingjing made typical Yunnanese  native food, rice 
noodles, an attempt to activate and strengthen the ties to Yunnan, which was also 
Xuemei and Meili’s native province. However, her way of behaving and by 
constant hanging around their shop made my interlockers uneasy. One night 
Wang told Xuemei over dinner; ‘Do not trust her, you never know who you can 
trust!’ ‘You never know about these people and what their real agenda is’, Xiang 
supplemented.54  
 
Based on this I want to highlight that in places like Xiwang Cun knowledge and access is 
shared on a need to know basis and along lines of loyalty and sentiments. Jingjing tried to 
establish a relation through making traditional Yunnan dishes to my interlockers, were the 
food was supposed to resonate with their common primordial native place. Though, in this 
setting food was no guarantee for establishing and including Jingjing into my interlockers’ 
closer relational network. This is another aspect that distinguish guanxi from Bourdieu`s 
(1986) notion of ‘social capital’, the importance of sentiments- ganqing. Despite the fact that 
many people view guanxi as being something purely instrumentalistic, what is often stressed 
from Chinese side is the need for true guanxi to have ‘an affective component’ (Gold et al., 
2002:7). In the competitive environment that my interlockers found themselves Jingjing’s 
presence was viewed as a potential threat, rather than a potential relation. This might also be 
due to her rural and ‘backward’ style, which could possibly jeopardize my interlockers’ 
project of improving themselves. Moreover, as Gold et. al. (2002) remarks, guanxi is 
something that needs to be cultivated and maintained over time, and like social identity it is 
not unilateral, but must be validated by the other part. I will now go one to analyse a situation 
                                                 
54
 This incident also explains why it was so important for me to have a relation to the people in 
Xiwang Cun and not be considered to be a ‘loose’ connection as also mentioned in the introduction. 
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that could have been fatal for the shop of my interlockers as Meili suddenly disappeared, 
leaving Xuemei and Huang alone with the management of the shop.  
 
Meili sometimes had responsibility for the shop in the morning, but often failed to 
show up. Thereby they missed out on selling cake to the rural graduates. She 
missed Yunnan but did not want to go back. ‘There is nothing for me there. I want 
to improve myself.’ At the same time she also said; ‘Life in Beijing is tiring, and 
to get up early in the morning is not good for my health’.  
One day Meili suddenly left for Chongqing with her boyfriend without any 
notice as to when she would come back- if she was coming back at all. This 
happened just after Xuemei had a confrontation with her regarding not doing her 
job properly or sacrificing as much as she or Huang did. Neither of them knew 
what do, they did not want to exclude her as she was the third partner of the store, 
while at the same time they needed someone they could depend on. Xuemei called 
her parents in Yunnan to get help. Her mother said she would help them by 
finding a new person to send to Beijing. ‘Why can you just get someone from 
here?’, I asked. ‘We want to get someone we can trust a 100%’, Xuemei replied. 
At the same time they also let their network in Xiwang Cun know that they were 
looking for someone, in case they knew a person that might be interested.  
A week later there were rumours that Meili would come back to Xiwang 
Cun. Xuemei had by then already arranged for the oldest boy of a noodle place 
across the street to start working in their shop by the end of the month. ‘We can 
make it without her [Meili]’, Xuemei said, and neither her nor Huang mentioned 
Meili for the next couple of weeks. However, the noodle place was unexpectedly 
gone one day and so was the boy who was supposed to help them. Instead a 
donkey meat restaurant had opened across the street. 
After almost three weeks Meili returned. By then a young man named 
Xiang had gradually started to hang out in the shop, running small errands and 
becoming friends with Huang and Xuemei. Originally someone that Meili had 
gotten to know, he became a part of the business around the same time period as 
Meili disappeared. He participated in the daily management of the shop, but was 
never officially an owner or manger. According to himself he was ‘just hanging 
around’, but since he was there he could also be of assistance if they needed help 
at the shop.  He was 25 years old and had been living in Beijing for the last six 
years and had been doing migrant work since then. I never saw him get any 
money from Xuemei, Huang or Meili, but he would eat every meal with them, 
which they paid. In the end Huang was also training Xiang to make the cake and 
thereby giving him a chance to either continue to run their shop, or start his own 
shop and earn money. The practice was similar to an apprenticeship-training 
place, creating bonds of trust and closeness. 
 
At this point I will stop and summarize some of the important points that our case story have 
shown about establishing and manage a shop in Xiwang Cun so far. Until now we have only 
 89 
 
focused on horizontal relations which I argue are important for rural graduates in building a 
network to manage the everyday challenges. This reflects how guanxi is instrumentalistic, but 
not exclusively so: ‘While the bases for guanxi may be naturally occurring or created, the 
important point is that guanxi must be consciously produced, cultivated, and maintained over 
time’ (Gold et al., 2002:6). Moreover, ‘instrumentalism and sentiment come together in 
guanxi, as cultivating guanxi successfully over time creates a basis of trust in a 
relationship’(Smart, 1993:402).  
Since the rural graduates in this case are not going through primordial relations they 
have to rely on other ways to establish relations to run their business. They had to juggle their 
connections and relations all the time, both from strategic reasons, but also emotional reasons, 
in managing the shop. As I have argued earlier, social identity have to be viewed as a 
processual dialectical relationship shaped in the interaction between people. This influence 
both the project of presenting an ‘improved self’, which was not always in correlation with 
the values and actions, executed to establishment a successful shop. First of all, the way 
people want to present themselves and the shop is not always an impression that is easy to 
manage; rather it can create a difficult situation where unrealistic role-distinctions are hard to 
avoid. This again means that they will either loose out in validating their wanted social 
identity in the processes of establishing a business. To enable this they were depended on 
dynamic solutions and larger networks based on new relations, which may be one of the 
reasons why there seemed to be so many short-term choices taken in the management of the 
shop. 
 
A health inspector and a jade bracelet 
Since Xiwang Cun is considered to be informal space it makes the task of keeping up an 
impression of a ‘civilized and urban’ business harder. The date cake shop did not have any 
permits to run and operate which was normal for restaurants in down town Beijing. The place 
was not governed by state mechanisms; still, there were actors that my interlockers had to 
interact with, serving the role of the party-state. Some were officials, not performing their role 
as they should, and others were not officials, but had the official power in the interaction with 
my interlockers. They represented a vertical, asymmetrical power relation where the informal 
met the formal and where relations between different institutions and groups where handled 
through gifts and bribes, leaving the rural graduate students at the bottom, while landlords, 
investors and officials were on top.  
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I will now go on to describe two incidents of interaction between my interlockers and 
men who commanded some local sovereign power. In this section the sovereign power comes 
to show through a man of the state, a health inspector, who acts as an intermediator between 
the formal and informal regulation. In the next section there is a local big man, who acts as a 
big man and intermediator between the state and the businesses in Xiwang Cun. Even if he 
does not hold any official power, he still has influence through his position as an investor in 
the area. These men are able to hold on to power since Xiwang Cun is ‘not entirely 
‘penetrated’ or governed by the state(..) nor by languages of legality’ (Hansen and Stepputat, 
2001:30).  
 
A small wagon had been purchased in the beginning of May and placed in front of 
the shop. The wagon had a traditional tiled roof and Xuemei had tried to make it 
nicer by putting up fake green vines, apples and grapes. It made it more 
comfortable to look at according to her and Meili. The wagon meant that they now 
could be out on the street in front of their shop and get in touch with their 
customers more easily.  However, it did not take long before people came by 
saying; ‘I do not think you can have that wagon out here on the street’. Xuemei 
replied; ‘but all you other people have small stalls out on the street, why cannot 
we have this wagon here?’ They just shuck their heads and walked on. Some 
weeks later when I was in the shop the following episode happened.  
A man passed by saying it was going to be health inspection soon. Suddenly 
the street started to pack down the things that were out on the street, remove their 
small stalls and exhibition windows from the street. Wang also asked me to help 
the push the wagon into a back alley.  
               In less than an hour the whole street was more spacious than I had ever 
seen it. There was not a single food stall, tarp or peddler out on the street. Not 
long after some guys walked past, talking to people in the different shops. Only 
minutes after they had passed people started to take out their things again and by 
the evening everything was back to normal. When I asked Xuemei about the 
episode she just replied,’Oh, that was nothing’ and avoided the questions. Later I 
asked again; ‘Who was the person that said it was going to be a health 
inspection?’. ’That was the health inspector’, Xuemei answered without going 
further into details. ‘Why would the guy that is responsible for the health 
inspection warn you about the inspection?’, I said rather puzzled. Xuemei replied 
to my question by telling a story: 
When she had worked in a magazine the previous year a politician had 
given her a beautiful jade bracelet. In return she wrote an article about him in the 
magazine which put him in a good light. Later she had given the bracelet to her 
mother in Yunnan. ‘So, what did you think about the bracelet?’, I asked. ‘It was 
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ok and nothing more really. That is just the way things work’, she said before 
leaving the topic and my initial question about the health inspector.55  
I later talked to both Mr. Yang and Huang`s cousin about this episode and 
they told me that they paid the health inspector around 100- 200 Yuan a month, 
depending on the size of your shop and how well you were doing, as a gift and in 
return he would let them know if there were any health inspections. 
 
Through telling a story paralleling the incident I had witnessed with her own previous 
experience Xuemei was both trying to avoid a topic that was problematic for the social 
identity she tried to validate through improving herself, as we saw in chapter three, while at 
the same time handling what she considered a natural way of doing business and creating 
guanxi. Whereas ’money/bribery relations are the weakest in terms of emotional 
relations’(Yang, 1994:123) when creating guanxi, it does not make them insignificant in the 
everyday interactions of my informants, ‘the gift exchange and the market exchange are rather 
looked upon as potentially complementary’ (Smart, 1993:399).  Henceforth, it draws attention 
to the problematic assumption that gift exchange and market exchanges are two completely 
different types of relationships. In the case above there are parallels to what Smart (1993) 
describes from his fieldwork in Hong Kong where‘ the presentation of gifts and the payment 
of bribes are central components of the establishment of capitalist relations of 
production’(Smart, 1993:389). This also follows Appadurai`s (1986) critique of the sharp 
distinction between gifts and other forms of exchange, and this it is more important to look at:  
 
commodities as things in a certain situation, as situation that characterize many 
different kinds of thing, at different points in their social lives. This means 
looking at the commodity potential of all things(…)(Appadurai, 1986:13). 
 
Moreover, the case above also counters Bourdieu’s (1977) argument that in order for a gift to 
be successful it has to be followed by ‘misrecognition’. Without that there cannot be a gift 
exchange and if the giver of the gift reveals its intentions the gift loose its original impression. 
Thus, both participants in the exchange need to play along, managing their impression and not 
revealing that they recognize the real motive behind the exchange (Bourdieu, 1977:5-6). 
Xuemei and the health inspector understood the implications the gift and exchange of favours 
had and I argue this could only have happened openly in a space like Xiwang Cun where ‘the 
                                                 
55
 This episode happened several times during my time in Xiwang Cun. Sometimes I would know 
that all the stalls would be gone long before I came into the main street. My home was maybe 10-15 minute 
walk away from the shop and all the stalls in the rest of the city would be gone as well, which left the place 
strangely empty and less crowded. 
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consolidation of social relationships built on gift exchange provides a substitute form of trust 
that can improve the profitability of investment and reduce the risk of arbitrary bureaucratic 
interference that is not in the interests of the investors’  (Smart, 1993:398). I now move on to 
look at the second incident with a man that had no official position, but was still a man of 
considerable power in Xiwang Cun. 
 
Dage laoban (boss) 
I still remember my first impression of Dage as he walked through Xiwang Cun always 
followed around by a crew of five-six men between 30-50 years old. Dage had migrated to 
Beijing when he was 15 years old from Inner Mongolia when he was 15 years old, and had 
started working odd-jobs. Gradually he had been able to build his own business and now had 
several big building projects in the loop; Xiwang Cun was one of them. He was well-off, 
married had two children, which of the oldest daughter would soon leave for university in 
England. He owned all the buildings opposite the shop of my interlockers. This meant that he 
rented out rooms to more than 20 shops, in addition to a kindergarten, shopping mall, brothel, 
photographer, dance school, restaurants and so on.  Despite not having any official position in 
the village, at least not to my knowledge, he was a man in his 50ies of money, guanxi and 
power. Even if I never had direct observations of Dage’s connection to the local government, 
I several times observed how he possessed powers few others in in the village had, which 
strengthen my impression of him as an typical intermediator between the villagers, the rural 
graduates and the local officials56. An example of this was when Dage blocked the main street 
so that only his cars could drive though the main street. He was constantly trying to invite me 
and my interlockers for dinner and there was no doubt that Xuemei also used me to get 
attention and a possible relation with him57. When he asked Xuemei how we had gotten to 
know each other she replied that we were lao pengyou –old friend- and knew each other from 
the time we were both studying in Yunnan. ‘Right?’ she said before turning to me for 
confirmation, knowing that we had gotten to know each other one month earlier in Xiwang 
Cun. However, this was a way of both creating a history with me as well as being able to 
show of her connections and guanxi. Dage invited Xuemei, Huang and me for dinner and 
karaoke the same evening.  
 
                                                 
56
 Zhang (2001) and Smart (2009) does also mentioned these kind intermediate leaders in urban 
villages, which helps the state to govern the areas. 
57
 Lin also argue for the importance of dyadic interaction and relations when creating guanxi(Lin 
2002 in Gold 2002) 
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 ‘I have also invited some beautiful Mongolian girls to come with us to sing and 
keep us company’, he said, ‘and we will eat a real and big Mongolian Hot Pot!’ 
With my former knowledge of these kinds of events I guessed that these girls 
were escorts that would be there to entertain the men. That day I had already 
planned to meet some other informants, so this resulted in Xuemei going alone, 
which Huang did not approve of at all. A girl, his girlfriend, going alone to a 
dinner with the boss and his crew was not to his liking. Huang could not go 
because of the shop, as they had no one to take over. Still, in the end he 
recognized the importance of Xuemei going. It would be very rude to decline an 
invitation from someone like him who was above them in the social hierarchy and 
a potential door opener to important networks and favors. 
 
After this episode Xuemei called Dage by his real name, trying to signal closeness in 
their guanxi. As this was around the same time as they were expanding their business 
she was also asking about the rent of his studios on the other side of the street and 
whether something maybe was available soon. However, Dage kept a distance and 
never answered directly to Xuemei’s requests, but kept inviting us for dinner which I 
tried to avoid, as there no such thing as a free meal. Still, one day I could not avoid the 
invitation, which further resulted in Dage inviting us out for dinner on my birthday.  
 
Some weeks later Huang, Xuemei and I had dinner with Dage and his crew. On 
the way back from the restaurant, where there had been plenty of food and alcohol 
for the men, Xuemei and I drove in one car with Dage and his driver, while Huang 
drove in a small buss with the rest of the crew. This had also been the organization 
on the way to the restaurant. As Xuemei started to praise Dage for the fantastic 
food and how kind and generous he was, he started to make a move on her. Sitting 
in the front he leaned back and stared to touch her leg while proposing how they 
could start an affair. ‘Huang does not need to know anything, it can be a secret 
just between you and me’, Dage said. Xuemei lifted away his hand and told his to 
stop joking. ‘Oh, Xuemei, do not act like that,’ he replied, while I was sitting next 
to Xuemei not knowing what to do, thinking about Huang who was in the other 
car. ‘You know, Dage’, Xuemei said again lifting away his hand; ‘I do not want 
you to think of me as just a cake shop girl. I want you to think of me as someone 
who can help you with marketing or anything else related to business.’ At that 
time Dage lost interest and turned around to face the front of the car again. Later 
when I confronted Xuemei with what had happen she said that we should only be 
grateful for the kindness he had showed us treating us for such an expensive 
dinner. The day after Xuemei and Huang gave Dage a gift to thank him, they said. 
The gift was a special kind of fish from Hunan58. Nevertheless, the relationship 
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 In China fish is a symbol of prosperity and wealth, since pronounced it can sound like happiness 
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between my interlockers and Dage was never the same again and he would 
seldom be observed in the area around their shop.  
 
Once again we realize the importance of analysing how networks are built and the importance 
relations play in the way people look at and understand others. The behaviour and impression 
of the individual is constantly monitored and evaluated in relation to those it relates and 
interact with. Furthermore the actions of the individual are constantly evaluated not only by 
what it, as a single unit, does but also the larger relational network it stands in relation to. This 
last case also supports the  argument for ‘dissolving the distinctions in a unified theoretical 
practice of explaining all actions as the outcome of the strategic pursuit of the advantage of 
the agent’ (Smart, 1993:389) when understanding gift or market exchanges. This is, as we 
have seen, because the outcome of the prestations are and what the motivation for it may be 
should be retained as open questions’(Smart, 1993:397). Xuemei, despite her constant 
impression management and work to improve herself, was not recognized as the person she 
wanted to be as she was already judged and evaluated as being ‘just a cake shop girl’ by 
Dage. The implications of this interactional juggle game my interlockers found themselves in 
when establishing a business in Xiwang Cun is something that I will discuss the implications 
of in the next section. 
 
Changing relations 
In this chapter we have followed three of my interlockers in their quest to start their own 
business in Xiwang Cun. Through that process we have learnt that except for having money, 
the organization and customers to be a successful business one is also dependent on guanxi of 
both horizontal and vertical ties. Furthermore we have seen how Xuemei, Huang and Meili 
exercised their agency in finding a flexible and dynamic way of exercising ‘practical kinship’. 
By ‘practical kinship’ I do not mean in the sense that Bourdieu(1977) described it, as 
individuals who exercised their agency and acted as best they can within the constraints of 
kinship. Rather I purpose that in the situation that the rural graduates find themselves in when 
migrating to the city, without family and kin, they invest heavily in creating ties of solidarity 
and emotions with close friend. This also mirrors Yan(2009:xxv) observation of individual 
villagers in his field ‘increasingly place more emphasis on relatives of the same generation or 
age group, a shift that parallels the increasing importance of the personal network, known as 
guanxi in Chinese’(Yan, 2009:xxv). That also means that relations of trust in an increasing 
degree come through the market as that is forming my interlockers’ networks. This also 
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contradicts and expand our understanding of primordial ties to be the ‘true’ relations and also 
the strongest and most important for individuals.  
Family, which can on one side provide an extended network and some cases money, 
can on the other side be a strain keeping the rural graduates back in their perceived 
‘traditional thinking’. An example of the influence family still have on the rural graduates 
despite being far away geographically was when Huang was angry at his second cousin 
because of the way her mom had treated his mom back in their home village. Thereby the 
relations there had implications for the organization in Xiwang Cun. Moreover this resulted in 
them not talking to each other nor trying to help each other for along time. I did not realize 
that there was a conflict before Xuemei once reacted that I had sat down to talk to Jiejie.  
Xuemei later told me that she saw rather that I did not talk Jiejie or her husband. When I 
asked why, she said that there was a conflict in Huang`s hometown and that his mother was 
not speaking to her mother any more. Apparently Jiejie’s family had been asking for more 
money and support from Huang’s family than what was acceptable.  
 This story fit in with the general picture I had of rural graduates after my fieldwork. In 
order to become a part of the urban sphere and create a social identity to go with the new 
social space one need economical capital. That is the entrance ticket so to say. However, this 
also changes the patterns of money remittances from the urban areas back to the countryside, 
which again affects the valuation of primordial ties as those that are the closes versus new 
friends and relations that can make a difference in the everyday of my interlockers. The 
majority of the rural graduates I spoke to rather spent the little surplus they had on 
themselves, or as we have seen in this chapter in professionalize and making new investments 
in their shop, hoping it would generate even bigger surplus. In some cases the parents in the 
countryside even had to send money to the rural graduates in the city so they could afford to live there. 
This meant that rural graduates were breaking the tacit pact of reciprocity between children 
and parents. I argue that the new patterns of money remittances among rural graduates are the 
result of new life expectation among the rural graduates as they see the city as a place  to 
‘improve oneself’ and for that they often need money.  
 It is also through the facet of consumption that we can understand another side of why 
the graduates choose not to move home again to their villages or home provinces. This 
enables us to see the graduates as more than just actors caught up in a Foucauldian web, but 
also someone finding holes to express their individuality and urban belonging and how social 
relations are changing as a consequence of the lives the rural graduates are living. 
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Concluding remarks 
In the meeting with the city many rural graduates tried to ‘create their own rice bowl’ in order 
to avoid being unemployed or underemployed. However, to become an entrepreneur there are 
certain assets that need to be in place; start-up capital, an organization to run the business and 
customers to buy the different products that are sold. In the successful management of a shop 
in Xiwang Cun entrepreneurial activities ‘are themselves social and cultural forms that draw 
their efficiency partly from sociocultural resources’ (Smart, 1993:338) which can be traced 
through the horizontal and vertical guanxi the rural graduates are creating. As the state is not 
presented as a regulative mechanism in Xiwang Cun it opens up space that had been 
unavailable to the rural graduate students in more managed areas. However, the rural 
graduates also have to relate to actors that take the role of the state the management of their 
business. Following Appadurai (1986) I try to highlight the calculative dimension present in 
both market and gift exchanges and show how there is also cultural dimension to market 
exchanges. 
We need to reconsider the primordial distrust in the market as a place where relations 
are being built. I show that my interlockers are dependent on creating new relations which 
comes out of their personal network, and not the family or kin network. Moreover, this creates 
new dynamics that one have to reconsider the current thinking about family as the only 
bastion for trust and relations in an ever changing world. 
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6 Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis has been to uncover cultural specific traits and articulations of 
governmentality and self-improvement in order to understand the changing dynamics of 
modern subject formation in China today. More specifically I have looked at how the Chinese 
party-state communicates the new situation of underemployed and unemployed rural 
graduates living on the outskirts of the big cities. Accordingly, I have focused on the 
ambiguity that the rural graduates in Xiwang Cun find themselves in when their expectations 
of life in the city does not match reality. Simultaneously I have analysed how the rural 
graduates are not only migrating to the cities to find a job, but also to get a chance of self-
improvement and thereby self-realization. I now present some concluding remarks, and 
highlight some observations that have been central throughout this thesis. This analysis has 
been made possible by employing different approaches in each chapter ensuring a multi-
faceted understanding of the everyday challenges for rural graduates in Xiwang Cun.  
 
State governed self-government to ensure progress 
In this thesis we started by focusing on ‘the people’, or ‘the rural masses’, as imagined 
containers for the nation’s character and quality, and in need of improvement if the nation was 
to progress. Through chapter two we saw how this has been understood through the discourse 
of suzhi- human quality- and wenming- civilization. It was only through cultivation of the 
individuals’ suzhi that one could ensure the progress towards wenming for China. Education 
was seen a tool to cultivate and manage the quality of the population, which resulted in a 
strong ‘educational desire’ (Kipnis, 2011) especially among rural parents who saw this as an 
investment in social mobility for their children. However, in the 90’s during the reform period 
the realities changed for graduates in China as a result of factors like dissolvment of the direct 
job assignment system- danwei- and educational reforms which opened up higher education 
system to the ‘the masses’. In the beginning of the 2000’s there was a jump in the numbers of 
people graduating from university, and with a wave of rural graduates free to finding a job in 
the city it created a tough job market and many broken dreams.  
 As we saw in chapter one many of the rural graduates end up living in urban villages 
in peri-urban areas of Beijing, either unemployed or underemployed, and living under bad 
sanitary conditions. These areas are by the party-state marked and represented as spaces of 
disorder and luan-chaos, and therefore a potential threat towards order and civilization. 
Though this thesis I have shown that the rural graduates represent an ambiguity in the 
 98 
 
unilinear development story. Although they are of high-quality the rural graduates represent a 
breach in the educational success story, ending up as ‘matter out of place’ in Xiwang Cun. In 
2009  the rural graduates destiny went viral in both national and international media through 
the book ‘the Ant Tribe’(Lian, 2009). Here they are described as ‘ants’ scrambling to the 
cities with their university diplomas hoping to find a new life in the city. However, in my 
analyses of the national media coverage of the rural graduates I noticed how the term ‘ant 
tribe’ had a labelling effect conceptualizing this diverse group into a unified, abnormal and 
potentially dangerous crowd that could threaten the civilized society. I showed how rural 
graduates are viewed by the party-state as being ‘out of place’ and in need of management. 
However, they should not be considered a homogenous group acting together towards a 
common goal as such. This is undertaken both through every day regulative practices like the 
household registration system-hukou-, making the rural graduates illegal subject in the city, 
but also through internalizing the toughs of self- conduct and through making choice a new 
tool of governance.  
 When I spoke with my interlockers and asked them why they had come to the city, the 
answer was always that the wanted to find a job. Nevertheless, it was not purely an argument 
on economic achievements that made the rural graduates stay on in Xiwang Cun. ‘I want to 
improve myself’ was the reply I got to why they stayed on in the city, even when they could 
not find a job. ‘Improving oneself’ meant different things to different people, but generally 
referred to a process of social mobility through both conscious and unconscious efforts at self-
improvement. This was an intangible quality that could only be obtained in the urban and 
modern city, and hindered a return to their rural province.  As I showed in chapter two 
improving oneself had a clear moral connotation in that sense that specially the rural 
population was perceived to be of low quality- suzhi cha- holding China back on its way 
towards progress and modernity (Anagnost, 1997). Each single individual was responsible to 
improve itself and raise its quality, and only then would China be able to progress and become 
civilized-wenming. All of my interlockers were very clear on their own role as independent 
from their family and larger relational network, and emphasized that coming to the city and 
living in Xiwang Cun were choices taken by them, sometimes against their parents will, and 
that they held the sole responsibility for whatever outcome their choices would have. The 
party-state had given them the freedom of choice and autonomy, but this also meant that they 
had no responsibility in case the rural graduates chose to do something else than what  the 
party-state recommended. The moral imperative was therefore I argued directed towards the 
graduates, and not towards the state. 
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Self-realization and a rising individual  
I followed Jacka (2006) and analysed how the discourses were experienced, negotiated and 
shaped by the rural graduates in Xiwang Cun. On an individual level it was argued that 
migrating to the city was not purely about economic achievements, but also gave the rural 
graduates a chance to self-improvement. The city represented an urban quality that could not 
be obtained in the rural areas. My empirical material show how the argument of an ‘excessive, 
rural population’ holding China back had been internalized in people`s self-conception which 
motivated the drive to ‘improving oneself’. ‘Improving oneself’, I argue, referred among my 
interlockers to a process of social mobility through both conscious and unconscious efforts at 
self-improvement. The analytical framework of Goffman (1959) on ‘impression management’  
was useful in investigated different arenas where the rural graduates were negotiating their 
social identity in meeting with others and the urban sphere. I analysed the encounters where 
specific processes of social identification occurred, as ‘identity is produced and reproduced in 
the course of social interaction’(Jenkins, 2008a:5), and showed that at times conflicting roles 
were played out and performed, creating dilemmas and non-realistic role distinctions. 
In chapter four the focus has been towards transformation of places of food 
consumption in China, fast-food places in particular, to social spaces where I argue the rural 
graduates tried to construct a new social space and identity for themselves in the urban sphere, 
while at the same time ’improving themselves’. A brief overview of China’s consumption 
history with focus on fast-food places exposed how Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) was an 
arena for a new kind of sociality in the space provided by the fast-food places. The rural 
graduates did not go there to eat, but rather negotiated an individual social identity, which was 
highlighted by drawing on comparative empirical material from eating places in Xiwang Cun. 
Instead of ‘being made’ into a rural objects the rural graduates tried to ‘make themselves’59 in 
fast-food places like KFC, claiming an urban membership and a place in an ‘imagined 
cosmopolitanism’(Schein, 2001).  
 
Changing relations, changing society? 
While the rural graduates tied to negotiate their social identity on a global arena in chapter 
four, the focus shifted in chapter five to the local realities and choices that the rural graduates 
faced in ‘creating their own rice bowl’. I followed three of my interlockers as they established 
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 ‘Being made’ and ‘self made’ are notions taken from Ong (1996) 
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a shop in Xiwang Cun, and argued that it is an informal space as there are no state 
mechanisms governing the area, which opens up new possibilities for the rural graduates. The 
maintenance and management of the shop, the establishment of new social relations-guanxi- 
with people they problematized the strong division between gift exchange and market 
exchange (Appadurai, 1986) as my interlockers created both horizontal and vertical relations 
in order to survive as a business. The management of the shop, first of all created unrealistic 
role distinctions and dilemmas for my interlockers in presenting a ‘civilized’ social identity 
which was considered urban and modern. Moreover my empirical material challenged the 
primordialistic ideas that family and kin relations are the closest relations for an individual in 
China. In a new environment and arena the rural graduates have to rely heavily on their new 
social connection in order to get by. This does not mean that the family loose its importance 
in relation to the individual, but get a new role in providing and arranging for the self-
realization of the individual. 
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Glossary 
   
 
  
   
anjing 安静 quiet, peaceful 
ayi 阿姨 aunt 
beipiao 北漂 migrants to Beijing 
bu yao langfei 不要浪费 do not want to waste 
chengzhongcun 城中村 urban village 
chi bu bao 吃不包 not full  
dagong 打工 temporary work, often used for migrant work 
danwei 单位 unit, often used for work unit 
pipa 琵琶 chinese traditional string instru 
fu 副 fortune, happniess 
gaige kaifang 改革开放 opening up and reform politics 
ganqing 感情 sentiments, affect 
guanxi 关系 network 
hukou 户口 househols registration system 
jiejie 姐姐 older sister 
jiewen 接吻 kissing, often used in the phrase 'kissing houses'  
lao pengyou 老朋友 old friend 
laoban 老板 boss 
laobeixing 老白情 `commoner', to be one in a hundered 
ling chi 另吃 trash food 
liudong renkou 流动人口 floating population', the migrant population 
luan 乱 chaotic, messy 
pifashicheng 批发市场 whole sale market 
pingpingjing cai 瓦片经财 tiles economy 
podan 破蛋 broken egg, can also be used as an insult 
putonghua 普通话 standard language, mandarin 
qifen 气氛 atmosphere 
renkou guoduo 人口过多 excessive population' 
renshan, renhai 人山人海 alot of people  
sanlun che 三轮车 three weeled bike 
sha bu liao 拆不了 impossible to demolish 
shushu 叔叔 uncle 
suzhi 素质 quality, not material quality 
suzhi cha 素质差 low quality 
tigao  提高 improve 
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tigao ziji 提高 自己 improve oneself 
wan 玩 play 
wenhua 文化 culture, proper manners 
wenhua suzhi 文化 素质 cultural quality 
wenming 文明 civilized, proper, modern 
woshou 握手 hand-shaking 
yizu 蚁族 ant tribe', rural graduates moving to urban areas 
youtiao  油条 fried dough, often eaten for breakfast 
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